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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUYERS
WITH RESPECT TO GOODS IN THEIR POSSESSION




One of the more frequently litigated questions arising under article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code' ("the Code") concerns what a buyer of
goods may do with the goods in his possession after he has notified the
seller that they do not conform to the contract and that he desires to return
them to the seller and cancel the contract. If the seller agrees to retake
possession of the goods and restores to the buyer any payments made under
the contract, the contract is cancelled. 2 Frequently, however, the seller claims
that the goods conform to the contract and refuses to retake possession of
the goods. At this point, the buyer is faced with a number of Code provisions
requiring him to do certain things with respect to the goods and prohibiting
him from doing others. These provisions are drafted in very broad language
and the attorney advising a buyer of his rights and obligations must resort
to the case law construing these provisions. Unfortunately, courts interpreting
these provisions have not developed a coherent or consistent analysis, which
has resulted in essentially irreconcilable results and an almost total lack of
predictability.
This article will explore the rights and obligations of buyers with respect
to goods in their possession after they have "rightfully" rejected those goods
or have "justifiably" revoked acceptance.3 After a brief discussion of the
historical development of these rights and obligations at common law and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University; A.B., 1973, J.D., 1976, Uni-
versity of Missouri-Columbia. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Lori K. Miller
for her valuable research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1978 official text, unless
otherwise indicated.
2. Although "cancellation" puts an end to the contract, the buyer still retains any remedy
for breach, U.C.C. § 2-106(4), including the right to sue for damages under § 2-712 or § 2-
713. 3A R. DUESENBERO & L. KING, BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 14.02[1],
at 14-7 (1985).
3. For a discussion of these curious adjectives, see J. WHmT & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-3 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Wrr & SUMMEaRS].
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under the Uniform Sales Act,4 the article will discuss the applicable provisions
of the Code dealing with the buyer's remedies of rejection and revocation
of acceptance. The initial discussion will deal with the obligations of buyers
who do not have a security interest in the rejected goods. The bulk of this
discussion will deal with the question of what a buyer may do with rejected
goods in his possession without forfeiting his claim that he has rejected the
goods or revoked his acceptance of them. The remainder of the article will
deal with the rights and obligations of a buyer who has a security interest
in rejected goods "in his possession or control for any payments made on
their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt,
transportation, care and custody. '
I. PRE-CODE LAW
A. Common Law
At common law, a buyer of nonconforming goods could inspect them
and, if the nonconformity was discovered by such inspection, either return
the goods to the seller or hold them for a reasonable time subject to the
order of the seller. 6 If the buyer was unable to discover the nonconformity
until after some prolonged use of the goods, most American jurisdictions
allowed the buyer the remedy of rescission, 7 a cancellation of the contract
which was intended to return both the buyer and the seller to the pre-contract
status quo. 8 Where rescission was sought, several courts held that the buyer's
continued use of the goods after discovery of the nonconformity amounted
to a waiver of the right to rescind. 9 Many of these courts noted that the
buyer's continued use of the goods after discovery of the nonconformity
had necessarily resulted in a deterioration of the value of the goods, thus
making impossible a return to the pre-contract status quo.'0 Nevertheless,
rescission was also denied in cases where the duration of the use and the
nature of the goods made it extremely unlikely that there was any deterio-
4. The Uniform Sales Act, the forerunner of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1906 and was ultimately enacted in 37 states.
5. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
6. C. TIEDEMAN, THE LAW OF SALEs 293 (1891).
7. Id. at 296.
8. E.g., Wall v. Zynda, 283 Mich. 260, 265, 278 N.W. 66, 68 (1938); 17 AM. JUR. 2D
Contracts § 512 (1964); Note, Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Revocation of Acceptance
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1371 (1978).
9. E.g., The Venezuela, 173 F. 834 (W.D.N.Y. 1909); America Theater Co. v. Siegel,
Cooper & Co., 221 Il. 145, 77 N.E. 588 (1906); Noel & McGinnis v. Kaufman Buggy Co.,
32 Ky. 576, 106 S.W. 237 (1907). See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2D 1173 (1955) (supplementing
Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1165 (1932)).
10. E.g., Twin City Motor Co. v. Pettit, 177 So. 814 (La. Ct. App. 1937); Hughes v. Wm.
F. V. Neumann & Sons, 253 Mich. 386, 235 N.W. 192 (1931).
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ration in value." Other courts held that any use of the goods by the buyer
after discovery of their nonconformity negated any attempted rescission on
the theory that the buyer was a bailee solely for the benefit of the seller
and hence should not use the goods for his own benefit, 2 on the theory
that continued use by the buyer constituted an election to accept the goods
despite their nonconformity, 3 or on the theory that any subsequent use was
inconsistent with the revesting of title in the seller at the time notice of
rescission, was received by the seller. 14
There were some exceptions to this general rule in situations where the
seller had authorized or requested the buyer to continue to use the goods,"
where the seller was attempting to repair the goods, 16 where the use was for
a very short period of time with no discernible depreciation in the value of
the goods, 17 or where the seller had previously refused the buyer's tender of
the goods.' Despite these exceptions, a buyer who made even the slightest
use of goods after giving notice of rescission did so at his peril.
B. The Uniform Sales Act
Under the Uniform Sales Act, a buyer of nonconforming goods who
sought to return the goods and cancel the contract was also granted the
remedy of rescission. The Uniform Sales Act provided that the buyer could
[r]escind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to receive the goods,
or if the goods have already been received, return them or offer to return
them to the seller and recover the price or any part thereof which has
been paid.'9
11. E.g., Fox v. Wilkinson, 133 Wis. 337, 113 N.W. 669 (1907) (use of engine for one-
and-one-half days); Palmer v. Banfield, 86 Wis. 441, 56 N.W. 1090 (1893) (use of harvester
for one day).
12. E.g., Sturgis v. Whisler, 145 Mo. App. 148, 130 S.W. 111 (1910).
13. E.g., Fred W. Wolf Co. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 252 111. 491, 96 N.E. 1063
(1911).
14. E.g., Comer v. Franklin, 169 Ala. 573, 53 So. 797 (1910).
15. E.g., Laumeier v. Dolph, 145 Mo. App. 78, 130 S.W. 360 (1910), aff'd on rehearing,
171 Mo. App. 81, 153 S.W. 510 (1913).
16. Crabtree v. Potts, 108 IIl. App. 627 (1902).
17. Hudson v. Roos, 76 Mich. 173, 42 N.W. 1099 (1899) (mirrors placed in buyer's store
for a day or two before buyer could notify seller of his intention to rescind). In Fox v.
Wilkinson, 133 Wis. 337, 341, 113 N.W. 669, 671 (1907), the court said:
Doubtless there may be situations where some use of an article after unsatisfac-
toriness is fully established is unavoidable to protect the purchaser from injury
or serious inconvenience resulting from the very predicament in which he is thrown
by making the trial, as for example, one who discovers defects in the trial drive
of a horse, and who merely continues the use to return to the starting point. In
such case the continued use might well fail to evince any intent to retain the
article.
18. Schwartz v. Church of the Holy Cross, 60 Minn. 183, 62 N.W. 266 (1895) (use by
church of one of several altars to celebrate mass after frequent refusals by seller to remove
the altars).
19. UNIF. SALES AcT § 69(l)(d) (1906) (act superseded by Uniform Commercial Code 1952).
1985]
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If the seller refused to retake the goods after the buyer's tender, the buyer
was "deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the seller," '20 subject to the
buyer's lien to secure repayment of any portion of the purchase price which
had been paid. 21
In order for a buyer successfully to rescind the contract for sale, the buyer
had to notify the seller of his intention to rescind within a reasonable time
and was required to return, or offer to return, the goods to the seller in
substantially as good condition as they were in when the buyer received
them. 22 If a buyer elected to pursue the remedy of rescission, it was generally
held that the remedy was exclusive and precluded the buyer from bringing
an action for damages. 2
The requirements that the buyer return the goods to the seller in sub-
stantially as good condition as when he received them and that the buyer
hold the goods as the bailee for the seller placed serious limitations on what
the buyer could do with the goods after giving notice of rescission to the
seller. Most courts construing the Uniform Sales Act agreed with the pre-
Act cases that any substantial use of the goods by the buyer after giving
notice of rescission constituted a waiver of the buyer's right to rescind the
contract.24 Also, where a buyer who purchased goods for resale continued
to offer the goods for sale and to sell them to its customers after giving the
seller notice of rescission, the courts held that the buyer had waived its right
to rescission .2 Likewise, the buyer of nonconforming goods who leased the
goods to a lessee after discovering the nonconformity was prevented from
invoking the remedy of rescission. 26 However, some courts allowed the buyer
to rescind where the buyer's continued use after rescission was "slight." 2
With this narrow exception, however, a buyer who continued to use the
goods after giving notice of rescission was almost universally denied rescis-
sion.
II. THE CODE'S REMEDIES OF REJECTION
AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
A. Introduction
The drafters of the Code consciously chose to abandon the use of the
term "rescission" when describing the buyer's remedies with respect to
20. Id. § 69(5).
21. Id.
22. E.g., Fuller v. Fried, 57 N.D. 824, 224 N.W. 668 (1928).
23. 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 612, at 362 & n.4 (rev. ed. 1948). Some courts allowed recovery of
expenses incurred in acquiring or using the goods, apparently under a restitutionary theory.
Id. § 612(a), at 365-66.
24. E.g., Modern Home Utils. v. Garrity, 121 Conn. 651, 186 A. 639 (1936); Advance-
Rumley Thresher Co. v. Wharton, 211 Iowa 264, 233 N.W. 673 (1930); Powers v. Rosenbloom,
143 Me. 361, 62 A.2d 531 (1948); Alexander Carpet Co. v. Worms, 269 A.D. 665, 53 N.Y.S.2d
4 (1944); Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952); Hall v.
Hodgdon, 114 Vt. 63, 39 A.2d 195 (1944).
25. Reno Sales Co. v. Pritchard Indus., 178 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1949) (applying Illinois law).
26. Peterson Oven Co. v. Guarino, 221 A.D. 146, 223 N.Y.S. 107 (1927).
27. Gottsman v. Jeffrey-Nichols Co., 268 Mass. 10, 167 N.E. 229 (1929).
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nonconforming goods. This omission is explained in comment 1 to section
2-608:
The section no longer speaks of "rescission," a term capable of ambig-
uous application either to transfer of title to the goods or to the contract
of sale and susceptible also of confusion with cancellation for cause of
an executed or executory portion of the contract.28
Instead, the Code refers to a buyer's remedies as "rejection" and "revocation
of acceptance." While there are procedural and substantive differences be-
tween rejection and revocation of acceptance, which are discussed below,
the effect of the two remedies is essentially the same: the buyer is relieved
of his obligation to pay the unpaid contract price 9 and is entitled to recover
any payments made to the seller.30 It is also important to note the economic
consequences of a rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance.
When the buyer properly exercises these remedies, any loss resulting from
depreciation of the goods is thrown back on the seller.' The position of
buyers who have rejected nonconforming goods or revoked their acceptance
of such goods should be contrasted with buyers who have accepted the goods
and sue for damages for breach. The latter buyers can recover "the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach ' 32 and,
in the event of a breach of warranty, the measure of damages is usually
"the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted. ' a3 However, a buyer who has accepted the goods and sues for
damages is not entitled to recover damages for any depreciation or decline
in the market value of the goods which did not result from the alleged
nonconformity.
Thus, the remedies of rejection and revocation of acceptance are of con-
siderable utility to a buyer of nonconforming goods. That is the good news
for the buyer; the bad news is that the rejecting or revoking buyer must be
careful to follow the procedures required by the Code for the exercise of
these remedies, or forfeit his right to invoke them. Hence, a brief discussion
28. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1. There is some question whether the pre-Code remedy of
rescission remains a viable remedy for the buyer of nonconforming goods. Professors White
and Summers conclude that, absent mistake, fraud, duress, or the like, the Code preempts the
field and the buyer's only remedies in regard to return of the goods are those specified in
article 2. WHIn-E & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 8-1, at 295. Accord Koperski v. Husker Dodge,
Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 302 N.W.2d 655, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 113 (1981)- Contra Sarnecki v. Al
Johns Pontiac, 56 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports 293, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1121 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1966).
A number of courts have suggested that the nomenclature of the remedy is irrelevant. E.g.,
Gilson v. Twin Trailer Sales of Sharon, Inc., 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 311, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
120 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
29. Wiwrr & Summanss, supra note 3, § 8-1, at 294.
30. U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
31. WmTrE & Summsits, supra note 3, § 8-1, at 294-95.
32. U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
33. U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
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of the required procedures for a rightful rejection or justifiable revocation
of acceptance follows.
B. Procedural Requirements for Rightful Rejection
The general requirements governing the manner and effect of rightful
rejection are set forth in section 2-602 of the Code. That section contains
two principal procedural requirements for a rightful rejection: timeliness and
notice.
The rejection must occur within a reasonable time after the goods are
delivered or tendered.14 What constitutes a reasonable time depends on the
nature, purpose and circumstances of the transaction.35 The parties to the
sales contract may, by agreement,36 fix a time within which rejection must
occur, and such agreement will be given effect if it is not "manifestly
unreasonable. '37 Nevertheless, the Code provides that the buyer does not
accept goods by failing to make an effective rejection until the buyer has
had a "reasonable opportunity" to inspect the goods."
In addition to the right to a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods,
the reasonableness of the time of rejection may also be extended by the
seller's promises to cure a defect which would otherwise give rise to a right
to reject. In Jones v. Abriani,39 buyers purchased a mobile home which
failed to conform to the contract in various ways, both apparent and hidden.
The buyers sought to refuse delivery, but were told by the seller's agent that
they would forfeit their down payment if they refused delivery. Having taken
possession of the mobile home, the buyers made numerous complaints to
the seller, who repeatedly assured the buyers that the defects in the mobile
home would be cured. About one year after first taking possession, the
buyers filed an action seeking to rescind the contract. The court held that
this one-year period was a reasonable time in which to reject. 40 The court
noted that the buyers were entitled to "try out" the goods to discover defects
in the mobile home for a reasonable period before acceptance occurred4'
and that this was especially true where the seller had assured the buyer that
any defects would be remedied. 42 Most other courts which have addressed
34. U.C.C. § 2-602(1).
35. U.C.C. § 1-204(2).
36. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) defines the term "agreement." In determining the reasonableness of
the time of rejection, course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance are relevant.
U.C.C. § 1-204 comment 2.
37. U.C.C. § 1-204(1). Comment I to this section provides that the parties may fix "any
time which is not obviously unfair as judged by the time of contracting."
38. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b).
39. 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1102 (1976).
40. Id. at 568, 350 N.E.2d at 643-44, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1112-13.
41. Id., 350 N.E.2d at 643, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1112.
42. Id., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1112-13.
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the issue agree that a seller's promise to repair extends the time in which a
rejection will be found to be reasonable. 3
In addition to the requirement that rejection occur within a reasonable
time after tender or delivery, section 2-602 requires that the buyer seasonably
notify the seller of the rejection. At the outset, it should be noted that the
content of the notification of rejection requires more of the buyer than does
the notice of breach required to preserve the buyer's claim for damages
pursuant to section 2-607 of the Code. Under section 2-607, notice of breach
need only "be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still
troublesome and must be watched.""4 Generally, however, the Code does
not require a rejecting buyer to specify the nonconformity unless a merchant
seller makes a written demand on a merchant buyer for such particulars
pursuant to section 2-605(1)(b), or unless the defect could have been cured
by the seller if stated seasonably. An official comment to section 2-605
indicates that this section is designed to permit the buyer to give "quick
and informal notice of defects in a tender without penalizing him for omis-
sions in his statement '"4 unless the seller has been prejudiced by a misleading
statement designed to prevent his opportunity to cure.4 6
Despite this seemingly lenient view of what type of notice is required, a
number of early cases under the Code found several types of notice to be
insufficient. Some courts held that the notice of rejection had to be in
writing. 47 Other courts held that an offer by the buyer to return the goods
was not sufficient notice. 48 Several courts took the view that the notice of
rejection must be "clear and unambiguous. '49
More recent cases, however, have demanded considerably less formality
in the buyer's notice of rejection. In Western Conference Resorts, Inc. v.
Pease5 0 the court held that telephone calls from the buyers of an airplane
to the seller's agent, which included the statement, "I don't think I want
this airplane," constituted sufficient notice of rejection. In Kabco Equipment
Specialists v. Budgetel, Inc.,5 the buyer of a commercial washing machine
43. E.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 608 (1969); Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 223, 428 P.2d 398, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 369
(1967).
44. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4. Cf. Solar Kinetics Corp. v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son,
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1237, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 85 (D. Conn. 1980); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Sygitowicz, 18 Wash. App. 658, 571 P.2d 224, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1151 (1977).
45. U.C.C. § 2-605 comment 1.
46. Id.
47. E.g., Julian C. Cohen Salvage Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 205 Pa. Super. 26,
206 A.2d 331, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 432 (1965). Contra Melms v. Mitchell, 266 Or. 208, 512
P.2d 1336, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 223 (1973) (oral notice sufficient).
48. E.g., Grossman v. D'Or, 98 I11. App. 2d 198, 240 N.E.2d 266 (1968); Akron Brick &
Block Co. v. Moniz Eng'g Co., 365 Mass. 92, 310 N.E.2d 128, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 563
(1974).
49. E.g., Shreve v. Castro Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 796 (1966).
50. 668 P.2d 973, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 131 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
51. 2 Ohio App. 3d 58, 440 N.E.2d 611, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 140 (1981).
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was deemed to have given sufficient notice of rejection when it filed suit
against the seller seeking return of the purchase price. Finally, in Steinmetz
v. Robertus," a buyer of a defective irrigation pump was deemed to have
given sufficient notice of rejection when he twice called the seller and com-
plained that the pump was not working properly, when he complained to
the seller's agent three times about unsuccessful attempts at repair, and when
he refused to pay any part of the purchase price for a period of several
months after the sale.
Although this liberalizing trend has its advantages, particularly in recog-
nizing the validity of oral notices of rejection, 53 the substance of the notices
in these cases is troubling. The act of rejection is one that significantly
affects the relative rights and obligations of both buyers and sellers. The
principal virtue of rejection is that the buyer can cancel his contractual
obligations and throw the goods back on the seller. Thus, at a minimum,
the notice of rejection should clearly indicate that the buyer views his con-
tractual obligations as having been terminated due to the nonconformity of
the goods and that the buyer does not wish to keep the goods . 4 Merely
complaining about the quality of the goods, without more, does not ade-
quately inform the seller that the buyer does not wish to retain the goods.
C. Requirements for Justifiable Revocation of Acceptance
In order for a revocation of acceptance to be "justifiable," the noncon-
formity must substantially impair the value of the goods to the buyer."
Whether such substantial impairment of value exists is generally a question
of fact.56 In addition to the requirement of substantial impairment, the
buyer's acceptance must have been based on either the reasonable assumption
that the nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured,
or the buyer must have accepted the goods without discovery of the non-
conformity and his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty
of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.57
52. 196 Mont. 311, 637 P.2d 31, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1441 (1981).
53. Section 2-602 does not, by its terms, require written notice. Section 1-201(26) provides:
"A person 'notifies' or 'gives' a notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may
be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually
comes to know of it." When the drafters of article 2 intended to require written notice, they
made such intent clear. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-605(l)(b) (written request for a full and final statement
of defects), 2-607(5)(a) (written notice of litigation by buyer seeking to "vouch in" a seller),
2-609(1) (written request for adequate assurance of due performance), 2-616(1) (written noti-
fication from buyer to seller claiming excuse due to impracticability).
54. E.g., Connecticut Investment Casting Corp. v. Made-Rite Tool Co., 382 Mass. 603,
416 N.E.2d 966, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 531 (1981).
55. U.C.C. § 2-608(1).
56. Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 481, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 181, 186 (N.D.
1980); Frontier Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 256 Ark. 101, 103-04, 505 S.W.2d 516,
517, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 411, 414 (1974).
57. U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a), (b).
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In order to be "justifiable," a revocation of acceptance must occur within
a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the
ground for it,58 and the revocation is not effective until the buyer notifies
the seller of the revocation. 9 Thus, notice must be given within a reasonable
time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the nonconformity.
Essentially the same standards of timeliness and content of the notice apply
to revocation of acceptance as to rejection60 except that the reasonableness
of the time of notice of revocation is usually longer due to the assumption that
the parties will usually spend some time seeking an adjustment of the dispute
before revocation of acceptance occurs. 6' A failure to give notice of the
revocation within a reasonable time means that there has been no justifiable
revocation of acceptance, and thus the buyer has accepted the goods and
must pay the contract price.62 The buyer, however, retains an action for
damages with regard to any nonconformity of the accepted goods.63 Assuming
that the prerequisites for a justifiable revocation of acceptance have occurred,
the buyer has the same rights and duties with respect to the goods as if he
had rejected them. 4
The remainder of this article proceeds on the premise that the buyer of
nonconforming goods has complied with all of the procedures for a rightful
rejection or a justifiable revocation of acceptance. Furthermore, it will be
assumed that the rejection or revocation of acceptance was also substantively
justified-that is, in the case of rejection, the goods failed to conform to
the contract and, in the case of revocation of acceptance, the nonconformity
substantially impaired the value of the goods to the buyer. The remainder
of the article will focus on the buyer's rights and obligations with respect
to the goods after the rejection or revocation of acceptance.
III. THE OBLIGATION TO HOLD THE GOODS
WITH REASONABLE CARE AT THE SELLER'S DISPOSITION
Section 2-602(2)(b) of the Code provides that a buyer of goods who has
physical possession of them, but who does not have a security interest in
the goods pursuant to section 2-711(3),65 "is under a duty after rejection to
58. U.C.C. § 2-608(2).
59. Id.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 34-54.
61. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 4.
62. U.C.C. § 2-607(1).
63. U.C.C. § 2-607(2). See U.C.C. § 2-714.
64. U.C.C. § 2-608(3). The remainder of this article will employ the term "rejecting buyer"
to describe both a buyer who has rightfully rejected nonconforming goods and a buyer who
has justifiably revoked his acceptance of such goods. If the rights or obligations of a buyer
vary depending on whether he rejected the goods or revoked his acceptance of them, such
differences will be noted.
65. For a discussion of the rights and obligations of buyers who do not have such a security
interest in goods, see infra text accompanying notes 203-346.
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hold them with reasonable care ... for a time sufficient to permit the seller
to remove them."' 66 This section disposes with the Uniform Sales Act's
requirement that a buyer seeking to rescind a sales contract must tender the
goods back to the seller. 67 As one court put it, the seller has "delivered the
goods and .. .he should remove them or let them remain at his peril. '6
Even a post-rejection promise by the buyer to return the goods to the seller
has been held to be unenforceable as being purely gratuitous. 69
The obligation to hold the goods with reasonable care does not extend
indefinitely, but is imposed on the buyer only for a time sufficient to allow
the seller to remove them.70 At the expiration of that time, it appears that
even a casualty to the goods directly resulting from the buyer's negligence
would not prejudice the buyer's ability to claim a rightful rejection or a
justifiable revocation of acceptance. In Askco Engineering Corp. v. Mobil
Chemical Co., 7 1 the buyer of defective polyethylene, who had stored the
goods for nine months after giving notice of rejection and then buried the
goods, was held to have complied with the obligations imposed under section
2-602(2)(b), although the court did point out that the polyethylene was
"worthless" at the time of the burial.
What actions constitute reasonable care is purely a factual question, 72 but
the cases do provide some guidance about appropriate conduct. A buyer of
a defective boat who stored the boat in a marina and procured an insurance
policy on the boat was held to have exercised reasonable care with respect
66. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b). Because a buyer who revokes his acceptance has the same rights
and duties with respect to the goods as if he had rejected them, U.C.C. § 2-608(3), § 2-602(2)(b)
also imposes this duty on revoking buyers.
67. See UNIF. SALEs ACT § 69(3) (1906) (act superseded by Uniform Commercial Code
1952). See, e.g., Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. App. 11, 562 P.2d
1378, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1040 (1977); Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts
Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 163 (1980); Art Hill, Inc. v.
Heckler, 547 N.E.2d 242, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Arkin Imports, Inc.
v. Dorothy's Exclusive Fashions, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 871 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973); Campbell
v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 703 (1966). But see Underwood
v. Monte Asti Buick Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 773, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 657 (Pa. C.P. 1976).
68. Garfinkel v. Lehman Floor Covering Co., 60 Misc. 2d 72, 302 N.Y.S.2d 167, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 915 (1969).
69. Presto Mfg. Co. v. Formetal Eng'g Co., 46 I1. App. 3d 7, 360 N.E.2d 510, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1299 (1977). One commentator has suggested that such a promise should be en-
forceable as a modification of the contract, even absent consideration, pursuant to § 2-209.
Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The U.C.C. 's "Tarr"-Baby, 24 DRAKE
L. REV. 52, 67 n.67 (1974). However, because a buyer rejecting goods or revoking his acceptance
of goods is exercising his right of cancellation, thereby terminating contractual obligations, it
would seem that there is no contract to modify. Yet, if the contract of sale itself contains a
provision requiring the buyer to return the goods, it would be enforceable under § 2-719, absent
other considerations such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
70. Graybar Elec. Co. v. Shook, 17 N.C. App. 81, 193 S.E.2d 392, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1189 (1972), aff'd, 283 N.C. 213, 195 S.E.2d 514, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 681 (1973).
71. 535 S.W.2d 893, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
72. Whaley, supra note 69, at 66.
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to the boat.73 A buyer of a car who parked it in front of his home after
giving notice of rejection has been deemed to have exercised reasonable
care. 74 Thus, it appears that storage of goods in a customary place constitutes
the exercise of reasonable care.
If the seller fails or refuses to pick up the goods or fails to give reasonable
instructions to a merchant buyer within a reasonable time after notification
of rejection or revocation of acceptance, "the buyer may store the rejected
goods for the seller's account or reship them to him or resell them for the
seller's account with reimbursement as provided in [section 2-603]."1 5 The
Code specifically provides that the buyer's exercise of these options is neither
an acceptance of the goods nor a conversion of them.76 The options apply
regardless of whether the buyer is a merchant.77 Although the official com-
ment to section 2-604 states that these three options are "intended to be
not exhaustive but merely illustrative," courts have taken differing views of
a buyer's exercising other options with respect to rejected goods. For ex-
ample, in Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co.,71
a buyer of steel tubing which was chipped, marred, and allegedly worthless
scrapped the entire shipment sixty days after sending notice of rejection to
the seller. The seller alleged that the buyer's scrapping the steel tubing was
not authorized by section 2-604 and constituted an acceptance of the goods
under section 2-606(1)(c). The court disagreed and noted that the three
options listed in section 2-604 are not exclusive and that a "rule of reason-
ableness" should apply.79
However, in Bowen v. Young,s0 the buyer of a defective mobile home
continued to live in the mobile home for a year after sending the seller
notice of revocation of acceptance and spent about $600 to make the furnace
conform to the contract. The court noted that the buyer had failed to exercise
any of the three options listed in section 2-604 and found the buyer's
occupancy and repair of the mobile home were acts inconsistent with the
seller's ownership constituting an acceptance of the mobile home under
section 2-606.8I Thus, the court strongly implied that a buyer may only
73. Werner v. Montana, 117 N.H. 721, 378 A.2d 1130, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 894 (1977).
74. Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 116 Mich. App. 78, 322 N.W.2d 549, 34 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 123 (1982), vacated, 121 Mich. App. 466, 328 N.W.2d 678, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 438
(1983), rev'd, 420 Mich. 452, 362 N.W.2d 704, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1 (1984); Yates v. Clifford
Motors, Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 293, 423 A.2d 1262, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 967 (1980).
75. U.C.C. § 2-604.
76. Id.
77. The official comment to § 2-604 states: "This is not a 'merchant's' section and the
options are pure options given to merchant and non-merchant buyers alike." Id., comment.
78. 86 11. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 163 (1980).
79. Id. at 986-87, 408 N.E.2d at 408, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 171. See also Askco Eng'g
Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Corp., 535 S.W.2d 893, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1119 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976) (buyer's burial of defective polyethylene after seller refused to accept a reshipment not
an acceptance of the goods).
80. 507 S.W.2d 600, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
81. Id. at 603-05, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 407-09.
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exercise one of the three options listed in section 2-604 and that any other
action with respect to the goods constitutes an acceptance. At least one
commentator agrees that these three alternatives are exclusive and goes even
further to suggest that a buyer must do one of these three things.82 This
view cannot be reconciled with the language of the official comment to
section 2-604 that the three listed options are "not exhaustive"; 8" it is also
inconsistent with the language of section 2-602(2)(c) that, aside from the
buyer's obligation to hold the goods with reasonable care at the seller's
disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them, "the
buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods rightfully rejected." 84
Finally, the view that a buyer must exercise one of these three options ignores
the fact that section 2-604 uses the permissive "may" while the immediately
preceding section placing additional obligations on certain merchant buyers
uses the mandatory phrase "[the] buyer ... is under a duty . . . to follow
any reasonable instructions." 8 Thus, where the drafters of the Code intended
to impose mandatory duties on buyers, they had no difficulty making this
intention quite clear.
Nor is the former view, that any "reasonable" action taken with regard
to the goods is proper, a particularly satisfactory way to analyze these cases.
First, if the drafters had intended to utilize a standard of reasonableness as
a required standard of conduct, one suspects they would have done so
explicitly.8 6 Moreover, courts following this "rule of reasonableness" have
failed to articulate what facts ought to be considered in making the reason-
ableness determination.
A more appropriate analysis would be to recognize that a buyer is not
limited to the three options listed in section 2-604, but also to recognize that
some actions by a buyer are so inconsistent with the remedy of rejection or
revocation of acceptance as to preclude a buyer from claiming that the goods
were nonconforming. Viewed in this light, cases like Frank's Maintenance
make sense. A buyer who claims the goods to be worthless and destroys
them is not acting inconsistently with his claim that the goods are noncon-
forming. However, where a buyer continues to use the goods for their
intended purpose after rejection, such action may be inconsistent with the
claim that the goods are nonconforming.
If a buyer does choose to exercise one of the three options listed in section
2-604-storage, reshipment, or resale-the buyer is entitled to reimbursement
for his reasonable expenses in storing, 87 reshipping,88 or reselling the goods,
82. 3A B. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 2, § 14.02(1)(c)(i), at 14-19 (1985).
83. U.C.C. § 2-604 comment.
84. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(c).
85. U.C.C. § 2-603(1).
86. A number of Code sections specifically make reasonableness a standard of conduct.
E.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3), 2-206(1)(a), 2-206(2), 2-513(1), 2-515(a), 2-602(2Xb), 2-603(1).
87. Pacific Marine Schwabcher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Co., 525 P.2d 615, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 354 (Utah 1974).
88. Askco Eng'g Co. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 535 S.W.2d 893, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1119
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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including, in the case of resale, a sales commission such as is usual in the
trade or, if there is no customary sales commission, a reasonable commission
not to exceed ten percent of the gross proceeds of such resale- 9
A buyer who resells nonconforming goods pursuant to section 2-604 does
not, apparently, have to comply with the requirements of section 2-706
governing resale of goods by a seller after a buyer's breach, which are made
applicable to rejecting buyers who have a security interest in the goods
pursuant to section 2-711(3).10 Thus, the buyer need not give notice to the
seller of his intention to resell, 91 and he may resell at a public or private
sale using his sole discretion and is not bound to comply with the standard
that every aspect of the resale must be commercially reasonable. The sole
apparent limitation on the buyer's conduct in reselling the goods is that the
resale must be in good faith. 92
However, because the buyer must resell "for the seller's account," it
should be incumbent on the buyer to remit to the seller the proceeds of the
sale, less expenses and commissions to which the buyer is entitled. A buyer
who fails to do this, or who fails to keep adequate records of the resale,
runs the risk of a court concluding that the sale was for the buyer's account,
an act which most courts have found to be inconsistent with the seller's
ownership and thus an acceptance of the goods pursuant to section 2-
606(1)(c). 93
IV. ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF MERCHANT BUYERS TO FOLLOW
REASONABLE INSTRUCTIONS AND TO SELL PERISHABLE GOODS
Section 2-603(1) of the Code provides:
Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3) of Section
2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of business at the market
of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after rejection of goods
in his possession or control to follow any reasonable instructions received
from the seller with respect to the goods and in the absence of such
instruction to make reasonable efforts to sell them for the seller's account
if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily. Instructions
are not reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forth-
coming.'
89. U.C.C. § 2-603(2).
90. U.C.C. § 2-711(3). For a discussion of the rights and obligations of buyers who do
have a security interest in such goods, see infra text accompanying notes 203-346.
91. At least one court has assumed that the requirements of § 2-706 apply to reselling
buyers under § 2-604. North Am. Steel Co. v. Siderius, 75 Mich. App. 391, 403, 254 N.W.2d
899, 905, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 62, 69 (1977).
92. The text of § 2-604 makes no reference to the good-faith standard, but the official
comment refers to buyers who have "taken steps towards realization on or preservation of the
goods in good faith." U.C.C. § 2-604 comment (emphasis added).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 187-94.
94. U.C.C. § 2-603(I).
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The term "merchant" is defined in section 2-104(1) as "a person who deals
in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction . . . . 5 An official comment to section 2-104 provides that the
use of the term "merchant" in section 2-603 is meant to apply "to persons
who are merchants under either the 'practices' or 'goods' aspect of the
definition of merchant.' '96 Thus, the buyers subject to the duties of section
2-603 are not limited to persons who deal in goods of the kind involved in
the sale.
No reported case has confronted the question of who is encompassed
within the phrase "merchant buyer" under section 2-603 and a detailed
discussion of when a person may be deemed a "merchant" is beyond the
scope of this article. 97 However, the prudent attorney should keep in mind
that the definition of "merchant" relates to a person who has specialized
knowledge of either the practices or goods involved in the transaction. Thus,
in a recent case involving the timeliness of a buyer's notice of breach, the
court held that a joint venture of experienced sewer contractors was a
"merchant" because it had specialized knowledge of business practices in
the construction industry, even though it had no specialized knowledge of
the particular good purchased. 98
Assuming that the buyer is a "merchant," the buyer's additional duties
under section 2-603 only arise when "the seller has no agent or place of
business in the market of rejection." 99 The Code provides that general
principles of agency supplement its terms,100 and the reported cases have
disclosed no difficulty arising from agency questions. However, the term
"market of rejection" is not defined. Two problems could arise from the
use of this term: (1) what is the size of the "market of rejection"?; and (2)
what is the location of the "market of rejection"?
There are two reported cases giving some guidance on the question of the
size of the "market of rejection." In Traynor v. Walters,' 10 sellers located
in Pennsylvania shipped nonconforming Christmas trees to a merchant buyer
in New York City. The court concluded that the merchant buyer was subject
95. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
96. U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2.
97. The literature in this area is voluminous. See generally Dolan, The Merchant Class of
Article 2: Farmers, Doctors & Others, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Henkel & Shedd, Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Is a Farmer a "Merchant" or a "Tiller of the Soil"?, 18 AM.
Bus. L.J. 323 (1980); Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 307 (1973); Note,
A County as a Merchant Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 194;
Comment, The Farmer in the Sales Article of the U.C.C.: "Merchant" or "Tiller of the Soil"?,
1976 S. ILL. U.L.J. 237; Comment, The U.C.C. Merchant Sections: Reasonable Standards of
Fair Dealing in the Trades, 14 TULSA L.J. 190 (1978).
98. K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1, 13-14 (6th Cir. 1981).
99. U.C.C. § 2-603(1).
100. U.C.C. § 1-103.
101. 342 F. Supp. 455, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 965 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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to the requirements of section 2-603 because the sellers had no agent or
place of business in New York City.10 2 Conversely, in Arkin Imports, Inc.
v. Dorothy's Exclusive Fashions, Inc.,103 where both the buyer and seller
were located in New York City,104 the court concluded that the buyer was
not subject to the requirements of section 2-603.101 Hence, the size of the
market of rejection seems to be at least an area encompassing a single city.
There are no reported cases addressing the question of the location of the
"market of rejection." This is not surprising because in the normal situation
of a buyer who has only one place of business the "market of rejection"
would clearly be the location of the buyer's place of business. However,
some problems could arise in determining the location of the "market of
rejection" in the situation where the buyer has more than one place of
business. For example, assume that both buyer and seller have corporate
headquarters in New York City. They agree upon a sale of goods to be
delivered to the buyer's place of business in Chicago. The goods are delivered
and found to be nonconforming. The buyer's agents in Chicago notify their
superiors in New York City of the nonconformity and the buyer's agents
in New York City give notice of rejection to the seller. Is the buyer subject
to the requirements of section 2-603? A literal reading of the term "market
of rejection" might lead a court to answer in the negative because a rejection
is not effective until the buyer seasonably notifies the seller' °6 and because
this notice was given by the buyer in New York City where the seller does
have a place of business. However, this interpretation overlooks the clear
purpose of the additional requirements placed on merchant buyers under
section 2-603, which is to require the merchant buyer to follow reasonable
instructions from the seller in a situation where the seller is not in a position
to take possession or control of the goods. Thus, the term "market of
rejection" should be interpreted as meaning the market where the buyer is
holding the rejected goods.
The question of what instructions from a seller are "reasonable" is one
of fact. Section 2-603 does provide that "[i]nstructions are not reasonable
if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming."' 0 7 The section
implies that more than a mere promise for indemnity is required. However,
just because indemnity is forthcoming does not make instructions from the
seller reasonable. In Buckeye Trophy, Inc. v. Southern Bowling & Billiard
Supply Co.,10 the seller asked the buyer to reship the rejected goods and
102. Id. at 460, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 973.
103. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 871 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
104. According to the court, the seller was located in "the bustling, competitive, hard street
of Seventh Avenue" and the buyer in "the chic east side uptown of the Drake Hotel." Id. at
872.
105. Id. at 873.
106. U.C.C. § 2-602(1).
107. U.C.C. § 2-603(1).
108. 3 Ohio App. 3d 32, 443 N.E.2d 1043, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 140 (1982).
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offered to pay the freight costs, but the buyer refused to comply. The court
found that the buyer did not have to comply with the instructions, citing
evidence that there were substantial costs in preparing the goods for shipment,
that the seller refused to provide a final credit to the buyer, and that the
buyer feared that damage to the goods in transit would force the buyer to
"piecemeal any set-off due to the non-conformity."' 9
Where the instructions from the seller are reasonable, yet the merchant
buyer refuses to follow them, the question becomes this: to what remedy is
the seller entitled? The official comment to section 2-603 says that "a buyer
who fails to make a salvage sale when it is his duty to do so ... is subject
to damages pursuant to the section on liberal administration of remedies."" 0
Likewise, one would assume that a merchant buyer who fails to comply
with reasonable instructions given by the seller would likewise be liable in
damages to the seller. However, in Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc.,"'
a buyer of nonconforming potatoes was instructed by the seller to blend the
potatoes with others of a higher grade in an effort to make the potatoes
meet the required grade standard. Instead, the buyer processed the potatoes
into flakes and sold them to a third party. The court held that the buyer's
failure to follow the reasonable instructions of the seller, coupled with the
resale of the potatoes in the ordinary course of the buyer's business, con-
stituted an acceptance of the goods by the buyer and thus rendered the
buyer's rejection ineffective."12
The holding in Borges should not be broadly construed as precluding the
effectiveness of the merchant buyer's rejection or revocation of acceptance
just because the merchant buyer has failed to follow instructions from the
seller. Borges involved a substantial alteration of the condition of the goods
as well as a resale of the goods in the ordinary course of the buyer's business,
acts which many courts have held to preclude rejection or revocation of
acceptance.' 3 In the case where the buyer merely fails to follow instructions
from the seller, the seller should be sufficiently protected by an award of
damages for the buyer's breach of his statutory duty based either on the
deterioration in value of the goods or the loss of use of the goods by the
seller.
If all the above requirements are met, and if the seller fails to give
reasonable instructions and the goods are perishable or threaten to decline
in value speedily, then the buyer must make reasonable efforts to sell the
109. Id. at 34, 443 N.E.2d at 1046, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 143. Although the court did
not elaborate on the meaning of buyer's argument, it appears that the buyer contended that
it would be difficult to apportion any damages to the goods resulting from accidents in transit
and damages to the goods resulting from their original nonconformity.
110. U.C.C. § 2-603 comment 5. See U.C.C. § 1-106.
111. 101 Idaho 494, 616 P.2d 273, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1282 (1980).
112. Id. at 497, 616 P.2d at 276, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1286.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 172-94.
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goods for the seller's account." 4 Courts have been very lenient toward buyers
accused of failing to sell such goods, holding that so long as the buyer
proceeds in a good-faith exercise of reasonable business judgment, his de-
cision whether to sell will not subject him to liability.' 5
V. THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM
EXERCISING OWNERSHIP OF THE GOODS
By far the most perplexing of the obligations placed on a buyer of goods
after rejection or revocation of acceptance is the obligation to refrain from
exercising "ownership" of the goods. The term "ownership" is not defined
in the Cod," 6 and, theoretically at least, virtually any exercise of dominion
over the goods could constitute an exercise of "ownership.""1
In addition to the ambiguity of the term "ownership," a more significant
problem involves the determination of the seller's remedy when the buyer
is deemed to have exercised "ownership" over the goods. Two sections of
the Code are relevant here: sections 2-602(2)(a) and 2-606(1)(c). Section 2-
602(2)(a) provides that "after rejection any exercise of ownership by the
buyer with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller."" 8
Section 2-606(1)(c) provides that an acceptance of goods occurs when the
buyer "does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership, but if such act
is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him."" 9
As the following discussion will illustrate, courts have not developed any
satisfactory theory to explain their decisions that some acts of dominion
may constitute an acceptance of the goods precluding rejection or revocation
of acceptance while other acts of dominion do not. After examining the
different approaches used by the courts to determine whether a buyer's
continued use of the goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance con-
stitutes an acceptance of the goods, this article will suggest an alternative
approach to analyzing that question and will then apply that approach to
questions relating to other acts of dominion over the goods.
A. Possession of the Goods
It is clear that "mere" possession does not constitute an "exercise of
ownership" because the buyer is under a duty to "hold" rejected goods at
the seller's disposition. 20
114. U.C.C. § 2-603(1).
115. Sullivan Island Seafood eo. v. Island Seafood Co., 390 So. 2d 113, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
116. The question of what might constitute acts of "ownership" by a buyer should not be
determined based on considerations of title, insofar as article 2 rights and obligations are not
affected by passage of title unless a specific provision refers to title. U.C.C. § 2-401 & comment
1.
117. Cf. Wnm & SuMMERs, supra note 3, § 8-2, at 298.
118. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a).
119. U.C.C. § 2-606(I)(c).
120. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b).
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B. Inspection and Testing of the Goods
A buyer is entitled to inspect or test the goods to see if they conform to
the contract without thereby accepting the goods. Even under the restrictive
common law requirements for rescission of a contract for sale, a buyer was
entitled to inspect or test goods to determine their conformity to the contract
without fear that he would be deemed to have waived his right of rescission. 121
The courts reasoned that inspection or testing is often necessary to determine
whether the goods conform to the contract and that, because nonconformity
is a prerequisite to rescission, inspection or testing is not a waiver of the
remedy of rescission. The same result occurred in cases arising under the
Uniform Sales Act.
2 2
Under the Code, the right of a buyer to inspect goods without foregoing
his right to reject the goods is recognized in section 2-606(l)(b), which
provides that acceptance occurs when a buyer "fails to make an effective
rejection .... but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had
a reasonable opportunity to inspect [the goods]." 12 A typical case is Askco
Engineering Co. v. Mobil Chemical Corp. 24 where the court held that a
buyer of polyethylene did not exercise "ownership" within the meaning of
section 2-606(2)(a) when it tested the polyethylene to see if it conformed to
the seller's representations. 25
C. Use of the Goods
A recurring problem which plagues buyers who are in possession of goods
following rejection or revocation of acceptance is whether continued "use"
of the goods after discovery of their nonconformity will be deemed an
acceptance of the goods or a waiver of the right to reject or revoke ac-
ceptance. Initially, it should be pointed out that the use of the goods prior
to discovery of the nonconformity by the buyer should not affect the ability
of the buyer to revoke his acceptance of the goods. 2 6 This view is consistent
with the notion that a buyer has a "reasonable opportunity to inspect" the
goods before he is deemed to have accepted them. It is also consistent with
121. E.g., Boles v. Merrill, 173 Mass. 491, 53 N.E. 894 (1899); Rhind v. Freedley, 74 N.J.L.
138, 64 A. 963 (1906); Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Calvert, 89 Wis.
640, 62 N.W. 532 (1895). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1165, 1184-86 (1932).
122. E.g., Robinson v. Main, 227 Iowa 1195, 290 N.W. 539 (1940); Middlesboro Black Gem
Coal Co. v. Capps, 297 Ky. 600, 180 S.W.2d 567 (1944).
123. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b).
124. 535 S.W.2d 893, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
125. Id. at 897, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1124.
126. Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 283 Pa. Super, 293, 310, 423 A.2d 1262, 1271, 30
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 967, 978 (1980); La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395,
548 P.2d 825, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 120 (1976); Franz Lithographic Servs., Inc. v. Sun Chem.
Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 485 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 1984). See WirTE & SUMiMERs, supra note
3, § 8-2, at 298-99.
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section 2-602(2)(a), which provides that any exercise of ownership by the
buyer is "wrongful as against the seller" but which applies only "after
rejection." Hence, the only concern here is with a buyer's use of the goods
after discovery of the nonconformity and his attempt to invoke the remedies
of rejection or revocation of acceptance.
The Code does not contain any provision dealing specifically with con-
tinued use after rejection or revocation of acceptance, but the drafters clearly
sought to remove some of the restrictive requirements of the pre-Code remedy
of rescission by abandoning that term in favor of the term "revocation of
acceptance."' 127 By so doing, the drafters cleared up certain pre-Code prob-
lems involving the ambiguity of this term and also specifically rejected any
notion that the remedy of cancellation involved any sort of an election of
remedies.'
Although the Code drafters specifically ceased use of the term "rescis-
sion," this omission did not clearly signify any change from pre-Code law
relating to the buyer's continued use of goods after rejection. Indeed, under
a straightforward reading of section 2-602(2)(a), the buyer's continued use
of the goods after rejection clearly constitutes an "exercise of ownership"
which is "wrongful as against the seller." Furthermore, under a literal
reading of section 2-606(l)(c), continued use of goods after rejection would
certainly seem to be an "act inconsistent with the seller's ownership" and
thus an acceptance or reacceptance of the goods. In fact, many early cases
and a substantial number of more recent cases have taken the view that any
use of the goods subsequent to rejection or revocation of acceptance is
wrongful as against the seller and thus, ipso facto, an acceptance of the
goods barring the buyer from invoking the remedies of rejection or revocation
of acceptance. 29
However, in the early 1970's, some courts departed from the rule that
any significant use of the goods following rejection or revocation of ac-
ceptance amounted to an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership and
thus barred rejection or revocation of acceptance. 130 Many of these cases
involved the sale of a mobile home where the buyer continued to occupy
the home after he had given notice of rejection or revocation of acceptance.
One of the earliest of such cases to hold that continued occupancy of the
127. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1.
128. Id.
129. E.g., Waltz v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 307 A.2d 815, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 874 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1973); Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 188 S.E.2d 653, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1128 (1972); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 120 N.J. Super. 350, 294
A.2d 62, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 59 (Law Div. 1972), revd, 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491,
13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 449 (App. Div. 1973); Bassman v. Manhattan Dodge Sales, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 128, 129 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (buyer's "continued use of the automobile controverted
the claim of 'revocation of acceptance' as indicated in § 2-608" of the Code); F.W. Lang Co.
v. Fleet, 193 Pa. Super. 365, 165 A.2d 258, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 177 (1960) (use of compressor
for two years following sale constituted an acceptance precluding rescission by buyer).
130. See infra note 137.
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mobile home after revocation of acceptance did not impair the buyer's
revocation was Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center, Inc.", In Minsel,
the buyers purchased a mobile home and subsequently discovered numerous
defects. About six weeks after moving into the mobile home, and after the
seller's failure to remedy the defects, the buyers gave notice that they were
revoking their acceptance of the mobile home. The buyers were unable to
find alternative housing for a six-week period following notice of revocation
and' continued to occupy the mobile home for that period of time. When
the buyers vacated the mobile home, they left it in a clean condition and
continued to pay the utilities and rent on the lot for four-and-one-half months
after notice of revocation; it was at this point that the seller retook possession.
The buyers sued for rescission, return of their down payment, and incidental
damages. After a judgment for the buyers, the seller appealed and contended
that the buyers' continued occupancy of the mobile home amounted to an
acceptance of the home pursuant to section 2-606(1)(c). The Michigan Court
of Appeals rejected the seller's contention and affirmed the judgment for
the buyers. 13 2 The court noted that the buyers were under a duty to protect
and care for the mobile home for a reasonable period pursuant to section
2-602(2)(b). 33 The court held that the buyers' act of "looking after" the
mobile home was one way of fulfilling this duty. 34 The court then went on
to say that the seller's argument that the continued occupancy of the mobile
home was tantamount to an exercise of ownership and thus an acceptance
of the mobile home would be contrary to the "rule of reasonableness"
evident throughout the Code. 35 The court further noted that the seller had
shown no prejudice resulting from the buyers' continued occupancy of the
mobile home. 136
Subsequent to Minsel, a number of other courts also concluded that
continued occupancy of a mobile home by buyers who gave notice of re-
jection or revocation of acceptance did not operate as a reacceptance which
would render ineffective any attempted rejection or revocation of accept-
ance. 3 7 The courts gave several different rationales for their decisions, in-
131. 32 Mich. App. 10, 188 N.W.2d 9, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 448 (1971).
132. Id. at 15, 188 N.W.2d at 12, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 451.
133. The buyers in Minsel had made a substantial down payment on the mobile home and
thus had a security interest in the mobile home pursuant to § 2-711(3). The duty to hold the
goods with reasonable care under § 2-602(2)(b) only applies where the buyer does not have a
security interest in the goods. Hence, the Minsel court's reliance on the latter section seems
misplaced. However, a buyer who has a security interest in rejected goods is under an article
9 duty to use "reasonable care in the custody of collateral in his possession." U.C.C. § 9-
207(1).
134. 32 Mich. App. at 14, 188 N.W.2d at 11, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 451.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 15, 188 N.W.2d at 12, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 451.
137. E.g., Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. App. 11, 562 P.2d
1378, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1040 (1977); Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo. App.
527, 578 P.2d 668, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 881 (1978); Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes,
Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Erling v. Homera,
Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 181 (N.D. 1980); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or.
285, 545 P.2d 1382, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1206 (1976). Contra Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d
600, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (continued occupancy constitutes ac-
ceptance thereby invalidating attempted revocation of acceptance).
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cluding the following: continued use was substantially the same as storing
goods for the seller's account, which the buyer is allowed to do under section
2-604;'1" continued use was the most feasible way of protecting the mobile
home from further damage; 139 the general "rule of reasonableness" was
found to pervade the Code; 40 buyers experienced hardship when they vacated
another residence and invested substantially all of their savings in the mobile
home;' 4' continued use was the direct result of "oppressive conduct" of the
seller in not allowing the buyers to reject the mobile home; 42 and, when
buyers made down payments on the mobile homes, continued occupancy
was justified in order to preserve the collateral securing the security interest
granted to such buyers under section 2-711(3) of the Code. 43
Although these courts apparently concluded that the continued use was
not "wrongful" as against the seller, many of them nevertheless held that
it was appropriate to award damages to the seller in the amount of the
reasonable rental value of the mobile home during the period of continued
occupancy. 44 Analytically, it is difficult to justify requiring a rejecting buyer
to pay the seller the reasonable rental value of the mobile home during the
period of continued occupancy when that occupancy is not "wrongful as
against the seller."' 4
Despite this analytical difficulty, other courts quickly began to apply this
"reasonableness" analysis to cases involving goods other than mobile homes.
One of the earliest of such cases was Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine
& Foundry Co.,'46 which involved the sale of defective knitting machines.
138. Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 482, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 181, 188 (N.D.
1980).
139. Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. App. 11, 15 n.2, 562 P.2d
1378, 1382 n.2, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1040, 1046 n.2 (1977); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or.
285, 292, 545 P.2d 1382, 1386, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1206, 1212 (1976).
140. Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729, 733, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
874, 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
141. Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. App. 11, 15 n.2, 562 P.2d
1378, 1382 n.2, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1040, 1046 n.2 (1977); cf. Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind.
App. 556, 569, 350 N.E.2d 635, 644, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1102, 1113 (1976).
142. Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 569, 350 N.E.2d 635, 644, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1102, 1113 (1976).
143. Id.; see also Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 527, 530, 578 P.2d
668, 670, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 881, 883 (1978); Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc.,
562 S.W.2d 729, 732, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 874, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Jorgensen v.
Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 291-92, 545 P.2d 1382, 1385-86, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1206, 1212
(1976). For a discussion of this question in greater detail, see infra text accompanying notes 241-52.
144. E.g., Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 483-84, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 181, 189-
90 (N.D. 1980); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 292, 545 P.2d 1382, 1386, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1206, 1212 (1976).
145. One court justified this result on the ground that the equitable remedy of rescission
requires the rescinding party to restore to the other party everything of value received under
the rescinded contract. Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 483-84, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
181, 190 (N.D. 1980). However, in view of the Code's abandonment of the use of the term
"rescission," see U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1, this reasoning is not persuasive.
146. 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 449 (App. Div. 1973), rev'g,
120 N.J. Super. 350, 294 A.2d 62, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 59 (Law Div. 1972).
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After almost two-and-one-half years of attempting repairs, the buyer gave
notice of revocation of acceptance and demanded that the seller take back
the machines and refund the purchase price. When the seller refused, the
buyer continued to use some of the machines but replaced and stored other
machines. The buyer brought suit and the court granted the seller's motion
for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the buyer's continued
use of the goods after revocation barred the remedy of "rescission."' ' 47 On
appeal, the appellate division reversed and held that the reasonableness of
the buyer's continued use was a question of fact for the trier, thus rendering
summary judgment improper.' 48 The court noted the Minsel "reasonable-
ness" approach with approval and further noted that this seller was the only
domestic manufacturer of the particular type of knitting machine and thus
the buyer "was confronted with the grim choice of either continuing to use
some of the machines or going out of business."'' 49 The court further noted
that such use may have had the effect of mitigating the seller's damages
and that the buyer was acting in good faith.5 0
Inevitably, courts began to face the situation of a buyer's continued use
in the context of automobile sales. The decisions in these cases are essentially
impossible to reconcile. In Underwood v. Monte Asti Buick Co., 15 a buyer
of a defective used car drove the car at least 14,000 additional miles after
giving notice of revocation of acceptance.'5 2 The court, in a suit in equity
for rescission, held that such continued use barred the buyer from seeking
rescission.5 3 A number of other courts have reached similar results on similar
facts. J4
A substantially different view was taken in Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co.'SS
In that case, the buyer of a new car sought to revoke his acceptance some
147. 120 N.J. Super. at 355, 294 A.2d at 65, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 63.
148. 125 N.J. Super. at 258-59, 310 A.2d at 495, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 454.
149. Id. at 258, 310 A.2d at 495, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 454. The court did not attempt
to square this statement with the fact that the buyer had replaced some of the machines.
150. Id.
151. 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 773, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 657 (Pa. C.P. 1976).
152. The facts contained in the opinion indicate that the figure for the additional mileage
after notice of revocation may have been considerably higher. See Id. at 781, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. at 662.
153. Id. at 780-81, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 662.
154. E.g., Waltz v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 307 A.2d 815, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 874 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1973) (continued use invalidates attempt to revoke acceptance); Charney v. Ocean
Pontiac, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 982 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975) (buyer's use of car for several
months, including a cross-country drive, amounted to a-new acceptance of the car); Bassman
v. Manhattan Dodge Sales, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 128-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (buyer's "continued
use of the automobile controverted the claim of 'revocation of acceptance' as indicated in §
2-608" of the Code); Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 188 S.E.2d 653, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1128 (1972) (continued use invalidates attempt to revoke acceptance); Gasque v. Mooers
Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 120 (1984) (distinguishing
need to use cars from need to use mobile homes).
155. 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 929 (1978), overruled in
Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 134 (1982) (to the
extent Pavesi suggests the Code expressly recognizes rescission as a remedy).
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seventeen months after the date of purchase on the ground that the paint
on the car cracked and peeled and three attempts by the seller to repaint
the car had failed to cure the problem. Some seven or eight months after
the final, unsuccessful attempt at repainting, the buyer brought an action
for rescission. In response to the seller's argument that the buyer should be
barred from rescission due to his continued use of the car, the court stated:
No longer is a buyer barred from the remedy of rescission because of
his continued use of substantially impaired goods which are a necessity
to him; all reasonable leeway is granted to the rightfully rejecting or
revoking buyer. To require such a buyer to discontinue his use and suffer
financial or other hardship would be contrary to the Code's rule of
reasonableness and its underlying purposes and policies.5 6
The court then allowed rescission, subject to a set-off in favor of the seller
for a stipulated per-mile charge based on the buyer's continued use of the
car.'57 A substantial number of cases, including the bulk of the most recent
cases, have reached the same result on reasoning very similar to that in
Pavesi. 158
As this discussion indicates, there are two seemingly contradictory ap-
proaches to resolving the question of the effect of continued use of the
nonconforming goods on the validity of the buyer's attempted rejection or
revocation of acceptance. The first, mirroring the general rule at common
law and under the Uniform Sales Act, holds that any significant use after
rejection or revocation of acceptance is wrongful against the seller and thus
bars the buyer from claiming a rightful rejection or a justifiable revocation
of acceptance. The second, arising from the mobile home cases in the early
1970's, holds that so long as the buyer's continued use is "reasonable," it
does not render ineffective the buyer's earlier rejection or revocation of
acceptance, although it does give the seller a claim for a set-off in the
amount of the reasonable-use value of the goods during the time of the
buyer's continued use.
Both views have much to recommend them. The view that any use con-
stitutes an acceptance is consistent with pre-Code law under the Uniform
156. Id. at 377, 382 A.2d 956, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 932-33.
157. Id. at 379-80, 382 A.2d at 957, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 934-35.
158. E.g., Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 233 Kan. 1044, 668 P.2d 139, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1089 (1983) (buyer's needs for transportation, coupled with lack of public transportation,justified buyer's continued use of vehicle); Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co.,
304 N.W.2d 654, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 558 (Minn. 1981); O'Shea v. Hatch, 97 N.M. 409, 640
P.2d 515, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 561 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (sale of nonconforming horse;
continued use, including surgery to correct nonconformity, did not constitute acceptance in
view of seller's failure to retake possession of horse and lack of prejudice to seller); McCullough
v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
513 (1983) (buyer's limited financial resources, absence of good faith by seller, and lack of
prejudice to seller justified continued use by the buyer); Hardimon v. Cullum & Maxey Camping
Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). But see Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J.
277, 440 A.2d 1345, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 134 (1982) (overruling Pavesi to the extent it suggests
the Code expressly recognizes rescission as a remedy and holding that revocation is tantamount
to, and replaces, rescission as a remedy under the Code).
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Sales Act, and, because the drafters of the Code did not expressly deal with
the question of continued use, it could be argued that they intended to
endorse the earlier judicial interpretation of the effect of continued use.
Furthermore, this view is consistent with, but not compelled by, the language
of section 2-606(l)(c), which provides that acceptance of goods occurs when
the buyer "does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership."' 59 Finally,
this view is consistent with the common-sense inference that a buyer who
claims that goods are nonconforming, but who continues to use such goods
for the purpose for which they were purchased, is trying to have his cake
and eat it too.60
On the other hand, the "reasonableness" approach recognizes that a buyer,
particularly a consumer buyer, may have no realistic economic alternative
but to continue to use the goods-even though they are worth considerably
less than what he bargained for-because of the prohibitive costs of replacing
the goods, financing that replacement, and then storing the nonconforming
goods. Furthermore, since by hypothesis the rejection or revocation of ac-
ceptance was substantively. correct, it is the seller's own default which gives
the buyer this "grim choice.' ' 6' Finally, the seller could have prevented the
buyer's continued use by retaking possession of the goods.
A more appropriate way to analyze the problem of the buyer's continued
use of the goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance is suggested by
Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp.,16 2 and two earlier
commentators. 63 In Stroh, the buyers sought to revoke their acceptance
about one year after purchase of a mobile home and continued to reside in
the mobile home for an additional seventeen months. The court, in affirming
the buyers' right to revoke their acceptance, nevertheless held that their
continued occupancy of the mobile home was wrongful against the seller,
but noted that this should merely entitle the seller to an award of damages
for the value of the continued use to the buyers. 64 While the court in Stroh
did not amplify its reasoning on this point, the result is perfectly consistent
with the language of the relevant sections of the Code. Although section 2-
602(2)(a) provides that after rejection "any exercise of ownership by the
buyer with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller," 6 5
this section does not specifically provide what remedy the seller has with
regard to the buyer's "wrongful" exercise of ownership.
159. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c).
160. See Can-Key Indus., Inc. v. Industrial Leasing Co., 286 Or. 173, 183, 593 P.2d 1125,
1131, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 675, 682 (1979).
161. Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 258, 310
A.2d 491, 495, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 449, 454 (App. Div. 1973).
162. 35 Colo. App. 196, 202, 530 P.2d 989, 993, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 726, 731 (1975).
163. Whaley, supra note 69, at 65; Note, Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Revocation
of Acceptance Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1371, 1382 (1978).
164. 35 Colo. App. 196, 202, 530 P.2d 989, 993, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 726, 731 (1975).
165. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a).
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In contrast, section 2-606(1)(c) provides that an acceptance of goods occurs
when the buyer "does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership.'6
The substantial similarity in the language used in these sections could be
interpreted as meaning that any act which is wrongful against the seller also
constitutes an acceptance-or a reacceptance in the case of revocation of
acceptance-by the buyer, thus justifying the approach that any use con-
stitutes acceptance. This interpretation, however, overlooks official comment
4 to section 2-606, which provides: "Under paragraph [(1)(c)], any action
taken by the buyer, which is inconsistent with his claim that he has rejected
the goods, constitutes an acceptance."' 167 With this comment in mind, one
could readily conclude that although any act of ownership may be wrongful
against the seller under section 2-602(1)(a), such an act amounts to an
acceptance only where the act of ownership is also inconsistent with the
buyer's claim of rejection or revocation of acceptance. 68
If this view is accepted, then every continued use of goods subsequent to
rejection or revocation of acceptance is an act of ownership wrongful against
the seller, thus entitling the seller to damages for the wrong. 69 However,
unless the continued use is also inconsistent with the claim of rejection or
revocation of acceptance, the continued use does not amount to an acceptance
or a reacceptance barring the buyer's remedies of rejection or revocation of
acceptance.
This suggested approach will usually lead to the same result as the "rea-
sonableness" approach, but it has a number of advantages. First, it gives
full effect to the language of both sections 2-602 and 2-606, as well as the
official comments thereto. 70 Second, it avoids the problem of deciding which
considerations are to be taken into account in determining what is "reason-
able" use and what is not.17' Third, and most important, because the inquiry
166. U.C.C. § 2-606(l)(c).
167. U.C.C. § 2-606 comment 4.
168. Because a buyer who revokes his acceptance has the same rights and duties with regard
to the goods as if he had rejected them, U.C.C. § 2-608(3), the comment applies to cases of
revocation as well as rejection.
169. Some uses may be so de minimis as to give rise to no claim for damages at all.
170. One commentator has suggested that because so many other provisions in the Code
make reference to reasonableness as a standard governing a party's conduct, it is consistent to
read a "reasonable use" exception governing a buyer's continued use of goods into §§ 2-602
and 2-608. Note, supra note 163, at 1383 & n.88. The counter-argument is that, when the
drafters intended a reasonableness standard to govern a party's conduct, they had no difficulty
making such a standard explicit. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
171. One commentator has suggested the following considerations: the character of the goods;
whether the seller instructed the buyer with regard to the disposition of the goods; prejudice
to the seller; the length of time of the continued use; and alternatives to the buyer's continued
use. Note, supra note 163, at 1383-86. Few courts have endeavored to articulate the consid-
erations going into the ultimate determination of reasonableness. In Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile
Home Center, Inc., 32 Mich. App. 10, 188 N.W.2d 9, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 448 (1971), the
seminal "reasonableness" case, the court considered the failure of the seller to respond to
buyer's notice of rejection, absence of a showing of prejudice to the seller, and absence of
evidence indicating that buyer's continued occupancy was in bad faith or avoidable. In McCullough
v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
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is directed at whether the buyer's continued use is consistent with his claim
of rejection or revocation of acceptance, it focuses the court's attention on
what should be at the center of the dispute between the buyer and the seller:
whether the goods conformed to the contract and, in the case of revocation
of acceptance, whether any nonconformity substantially impaired the value
of the goods to the buyer. This approach also recognizes the legitimacy of
awarding damages to the seller for the value to the buyer of his continued
use of the goods, because such use is conceded to be "wrongful" as against
the seller. Finally, it also avoids the conceptual difficulty of the "reasona-
bleness" approach of awarding damages to the seller based on conduct which
is, by definition, reasonable conduct on the part of the buyer.
The following sections of this article deal with acts of dominion over the
goods, other than continued use, which have given rise to a claim that the
buyer has exercised ownership of the goods and thus forfeited his right to
reject the goods or revoke acceptance of them.
D. Alteration or Modification of the Goods, Including Repair
Under the Uniform Sales Act, a buyer who sought rescission but who
thereafter materially altered, manufactured, or processed the goods was
deemed to have waived his remedy of rescission.1 7 2 Although not always
expressed by courts reaching this conclusion, the underlying reason for this
result seems to be the Uniform Sales Act's provision that the buyer could
not rescind "if he fails to return or to offer to return the goods to the seller
in substantially as good condition as they were in at the time the property
was transferred to the buyer." 1 7 Because a material alteration of the goods
would prevent the buyer from returning the goods to the seller in such
condition, rescission was not allowed and the buyer was relegated to a suit
for damages.
Although the drafters of the Code intended to do away with some of the
more technical problems associated with the remedy of rescission,17 4 a number
of cases decided under the Code have stated, in broad language, that any
Serv. 513 (1983), the court considered the following: the seller's instructions to the buyer upon
notice of revocation; the business or personal needs of the buyer compelling continued use;
assurances by the seller that the defects would be cured; the buyer's good faith; and the lack
of prejudice to the seller. See id. at 184, 449 N.E.2d at 1293, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 518-19.
The careful reader is compelled to conclude that courts articulate considerations which are
likely to lead to the conclusion that the buyer's continued use was reasonable. Indeed, of the
large number of cases purporting to adopt a "reasonableness" approach, only a very few have
found the buyer's continued use to be unreasonable so as to bar rejection or revocation of
acceptance as a remedy. E.g., Underwood v. Monte Asti Buick Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 773,
20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 657 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker
Co., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
172. E.g., Powers v. Rosenbloom, 143 Me. 361, 62 A.2d 531 (1948) (removal and sale of
parts from refrigerator held to preclude rescission).
173. UNIF. SALEs ACT § 69(3) (1906) (act superseded by Uniform Commercial Code 1952).
174. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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material alteration of the goods by the buyer constitutes "an act inconsistent
with the seller's ownership," and thus an acceptance of the goods pursuant
to section 2-606(1)(c). One commentator has noted that there is "no case
in this area in which the buyer has succeeded [in rejecting the goods]."' 75
In order to more fully understand the effect of a material alteration of the
goods, however, a closer reading of the cases is necessary.
Two early cases broadly stated that any material alteration of the goods
constitutes an acceptance of the goods, but in neither case did the facts
indicate that there had been any alteration in the goods other than normal
wear and tear through use by the buyer. 76 Several subsequent cases have
restated the rule in equally broad language. However, many of these cases
did not involve a dispute where the buyer was claiming that the goods were
nonconforming. Instead, some cases involved the question whether the mod-
ification or alteration constituted an acceptance of the goods thereby doing
away with the requirement of a writing under the Code's statute of frauds
provision." Others involved the question whether the modification consti-
tuted an acceptance of the goods for purposes of applying the Code's risk
of loss rules.' 78 Furthermore, most of the cases stating this broad rule have
involved situations where the material alteration or modification occurred
prior to the discovery of the alleged nonconformity and prior to any claim
of rejection or revocation of acceptance.' 79 In these circumstances, the con-
trolling provision of the Code would seem to be section 2-608(2), which sets
out as a requirement for a justifiable revocation of acceptance that such
revocation occur "before any substantial change in condition of the goods
which is not caused by their own defects."'' 0 Even aside from the clear
language of section 2-608(2), barring revocation of acceptance due to previous
alteration or modification makes sense because the material alteration of the
175. Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Quarter Century Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, and Recent International Developments, 13 GA. L. REv. 805, 828 (1979).
176. Marbelite Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 208 Pa. Super. 256, 222 A.2d 443, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 845 (1966) (traffic lights); F.W. Lang Co. v. Fleet, 193 Pa. Super. 365, 165 A.2d
258, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 177 (1960) (compressor of ice cream freezer removed and used to
operate air conditioner).
177. E.g., Engle Mortgage Co. v. Triple K. Lumber Co., 56 Ala. App. 337, 321 So. 2d 679,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 310 (1975); Johnson v. Holdredge Coop. Equity Exch., 206 Neb. 568,
293 N.W.2d 863, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 764 (1980). Section 2-201(3)(c) of the Code dispenses
with the requirement of a writing with respect to goods "which have been received and
accepted." U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
178. Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 379 (Wyo.
1964) (truck undergoing modification by buyer destroyed by fire; no claim that truck was
defective prior to fire).
179. E.g, United States ex rel. Fram Corp. v. Crawford, 443 F.2d 611, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1210 (5th Cir. 1971); Mazur Bros. & Jaffe Fish Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 419 (Veterans
Administration Contract Appeals Board, June 25, 1965); Brul6 C.E. & E., Inc. v. Pronto
Foods Corp., 3 Ill. App. 3d 135, 278 N.E.2d 477, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 634 (1971); Ace Chem.
Corp. v. Atomic Paint Co., 31 N.C. App. 221, 229 S.E.2d 55, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 664
(1976).
180. U.C.C. § 2-608(2).
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goods may have caused or contributed to the nonconformity rather than
any nonconformity for which the seller is responsible. Finally, where the
material alteration occurs before the buyer attempts to reject or revoke his
acceptance, a broad holding that such material alteration bars rejection or
revocation of acceptance is consistent with the buyer's duty to hold the
goods with reasonable care for a time sufficient for the seller to remove
them.181 The clear import of this duty is that the seller is entitled to retake
possession of the goods. However, where the goods have been materially
altered before the seller is apprised of the alleged nonconformity, the seller
will not be able to get back that which he tendered, but rather will get goods
different in kind from what he sold.
These considerations which justify a broad rule denying the buyer the
remedy of rejection or revocation of acceptance where the goods have been
materially altered prior to the buyer's attempted rejection or revocation of
acceptance do not necessarily apply to the situation where the buyer makes
material alterations to the goods after he has given notice of rejection or
revocation of acceptance. First, because the nonconformity occurred prior
to the material alteration, the alteration could not be a contributing cause
of the alleged nonconformity. Second, because the seller failed to pick up
the goods from the buyer who was holding them at the seller's disposition,
the seller would not be in a position to claim that he was prejudiced by an
inability to get back the goods he tendered. A few courts have recognized
these differences and allowed a buyer to revoke his acceptance of goods
despite a material alteration that occurred after the revocation.
In O'Shea v. Hatch, 82 the buyers bought a quarter horse based on rep-
resentations that it was a registered gelding which could be used as a show
horse and with children. The horse turned out to be a ridgeling-an im-
perfectly castrated stallion with an undescended testicle-and could not be
used as a show horse or with children. The buyers attempted to revoke their
acceptance, but the sellers refused to retake possession of the horse. The
buyers then employed a veterinarian who surgically removed the horse's
undescended testicle, but the horse still lacked the coordination and dispo-
sition necessary for use as a show horse or for use with children. In a
subsequent suit brought by the buyers, the court held that the buyers had
properly revoked their acceptance despite the surgical alteration of the horse
and the buyers' continued use of the horse. 83
181. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b).
182. 97 N.M. 409, 640 P.2d 515, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 561 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
183. The court noted that the surgery was first suggested by the sellers and that the sellers
offered to pay for the cost of surgery; this could have amounted to consent to the alteration
by the sellers. Id. at 413-14, 640 P.2d at- 519-20, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 565. Where the seller
has consented to, or supervised, the modification, such modification is not a bar to revocation
of acceptance. Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 2d 361, 581 P.2d 1352, 24
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 832 (1978). Furthermore, where the seller knew the buyer would process
the material and that processing enhanced its value, such processing did not constitute an
acceptance. Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 475 (8th Cir. 1984).
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In Can-Key Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Leasing Corp.,84 the buyers
purchased a turkey hatcher which proved to be defective. After the buyers
gave notice of revocation of acceptance and the seller refused to retake
possession of the hatcher, the buyers employed the original developer of the
hatcher to try to modify it, but such efforts failed. The court held that the
modifications and attempts to use the hatcher did not bar revocation of
acceptance and noted that any contrary holding would penalize a good-faith
effort on the part of the buyers to cure defects and would also be inconsistent
with the duty to mitigate damages and the duty of good faith. 85
If these cases involving material alteration are viewed under the proposed
analysis, it becomes clear why alteration in an attempt to repair noncon-
forming goods should not bar rejection or revocation of acceptance. Attempts
to repair nonconformities after rejection or revocation of acceptance, even
though they may constitute an "exercise of ownership by the buyer" and
thus be wrongful as against the seller, should not preclude rejection or
revocation of acceptance because the material alteration resulting from at-
tempts to repair is perfectly consistent with the buyer's claim that the goods
are nonconforming. Indeed, where a buyer has continued to use allegedly
nonconforming goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance without
attempting to repair the alleged nonconformity, such use would be very
persuasive evidence that the goods were, in fact, conforming or that any
nonconformity did not substantially impair the value of the goods to the
buyer.
Of course, where a post-revocation alteration is not in the nature of repair,
the material alteration may be inconsistent with the buyer's claim of rejection
or revocation of acceptance, thus precluding the buyer from invoking those
remedies. For example, where an allegedly nonconforming good is materially
altered in the buyer's normal manufacturing process, such alteration is in-
consistent with the buyer's claim of rejection or revocation of acceptance. 8 6
E. Sale of the Goods in the Ordinary Course of the
Buyer's Business
A few cases have raised the question whether a buyer of goods, who
thereafter resells the goods in the ordinary course of his business, may
nevertheless revoke his acceptance of the goods. The answer has generally
been that the buyer may not revoke in this situation, regardless of whether
the resale occurred prior to any attempt to revoke acceptance of the goods8 7
184. 286 Or. 173, 593 P.2d 1125, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 675 (1979).
185. Id. at 185, 593 P.2d at 1132, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 684.
186. See Ace Chem. Corp. v. Atomic Paint Co., 31 N.C. App. 221, 229 S.E.2d 55, 20
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 664 (1976) (processing of nonconforming acetone into paint products after
discovery of nonconformity but before attempt at revocation).
187. E.g., Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 560 P.2d 789, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
490 (1977); Phil Jacobs Co. v. Mifflin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 999, 320 N.E.2d 329, 16 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 407 (1974); Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Sylvan Chem. Corp., 122 N.J. Super.
499, 300 A.2d 878, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 117 (Law Div.), aff'd, 126 N.J. Super. 261, 314
A.2d 73, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 123 (App. Div. 1973).
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or subsequent to such an attempt.' The courts have generally justified this
result on the theory that a resale in the ordinary course of the buyer's
business is an "act inconsistent with the seller's ownership" and hence an
acceptance of the goods under section 2-606(1)(c). One court also noted that
a post-revocation resale is inconsistent with the buyer's duty to use reasonable
care in holding the goods at the seller's disposition for a reasonable time.'"9
It is difficult to quarrel with the results in these few reported cases, especially
in light of the fact that some of these cases involved nonconformities relating
to the quantity of the goods sold to the buyer, not their quality,' 9° and also
in light of the fact that some of these claims of nonconformity were not
made until after the original seller had brought suit to recover the unpaid
purchase price. ,9
However, it would be overstating the case to say that any resale in the
ordinary course of the buyer's business should preclude revocation of ac-
ceptance. For example, in In re H.P. Tool Mfg. Co., 92 a hardware supplier
bought a quantity of wrench kits from the seller. The supplier then resold
the kits to its customers without opening the cartons containing the kits.
After receiving complaints about the quality of the kits from its customers,
the hardware supplier sought to revoke its acceptance of the kits. In an
action by the seller's trustee to recover the unpaid purchase price, the court
held that the hardware supplier's revocation of acceptance was valid. '93 The
court stressed that the resale to the supplier's customers occurred before the
supplier had any reason. to know that the kits were nonconforming. 94
The results in these cases are consistent with the proposed analysis. Where
the resale has occurred after the buyer claims to have rejected the goods or
revoked his acceptance, any resale in the ordinary course of the buyer's
business is not only an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership, but is
also strong evidence that the goods conformed to the original contract for
sale or that any nonconformity did not substantially impair their value to
the buyer. On the other hand, where the resale occurred before the buyer
had reason to know of the nonconformity, the resale, although "an act
188. E.g., Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 735 F.2d 177, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1210 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Kansas law); Alafoss v. Premium Corp. of Am.,
Inc., 599 F.2d 232, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 382 (8th Cir. 1979); Borges v. Magic Valley Foods,
Inc., 101 Idaho 494, 616 P.2d 273, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1282 (1980); Hays Merchandise, Inc.
v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 343, 474 P.2d 270, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 31 (1970).
189. Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 343, 474 P.2d 270, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 31 (1970). See U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b).
190. Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 560 P.2d 789, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 490
(1977); Phil Jacobs Co. v. Mifflin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 999, 320 N.E.2d 329, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
407 (1974).
191. Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 560 P.2d 789, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 490
(1977).
192. 37 Bankr. 885, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 110 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
193. Id. at 888, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 113.
194. Id. Accord Jacob Hartz Seed Co. v. Coleman, 271 Ark. 756, 612 S.W.2d 91, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 944 (1981).
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inconsistent with the seller's ownership" and thus wrongful as against the
seller, is not an act inconsistent with the buyer's claim of revocation of
acceptance because it does not tend to show that the goods were conforming
nor does it tend to show that the nonconformity did not substantially impair the
value of the goods to the buyer.
F. Making Payments on the Goods
When the buyer has made payments on the goods to the seller, two reported
cases have found that such payments bar a claim of revocation of accept-
ance 95 In both cases, the payments were made before notice of revocation
was given, which was in the buyer's answer to the seller's complaint for the
unpaid purchase price. However, these cases should not be read as meaning
that payments made to the seller prior to notice of revocation of acceptance
always preclude the remedy of revocation of acceptance. Section 2-711(1)
allows a buyer who justifiably revokes acceptance to recover "so much of
the price as has been paid."' 96 Furthermore, section 2-711(3) grants a buyer
a security interest in the nonconforming goods to secure reimbursement for
any payments made on the price of those goods.'9 These provisions would
be rendered meaningless if any payment on the purchase price precluded the
buyer from rejecting the goods or revoking his acceptance of them. Under
the proposed analysis, the mere fact that the buyer has made payments on
the goods to the seller before he has reason to know of the nonconformity
should not preclude the buyer from rejecting the goods or revoking his
acceptance of them. Even though such acts may be inconsistent with the
seller's ownership, they are not inconsistent with the buyer's claim of re-
jection or revocation of acceptance.
No reported cases have dealt with the question of the effect of continued
payments to the seller following the buyer's rejection or revocation of ac-
ceptance. Under the proposed analysis, payments made to the seller after
revocation of acceptance should normally bar a buyer from claiming revo-
cation of acceptance. Such an act is not only inconsistent with the seller's
ownership, but it is also inconsistent with the buyer's claim of revocation
of acceptance. Because a justifiable revocation of acceptance relieves the
buyer of his obligation to pay the contract price, 98 continued payments
constitute a recognition by the buyer that the contract price is still owing
and are thus inconsistent with the claim of revocation of acceptance.
195. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Taylor, 82 N.M. 670, 486 P.2d 606, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
668 (1971); Donnell & Mudge, Inc. v. Bonita Leather Fashions, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 699
(N.Y. App. Term. 1971).
196. U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
197. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).




Payments made to an independent third-party lender, however, stand on
a different footing. In Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge- Winnebago South, I the
buyers of a nonconforming motorhome continued making installment pay-
ments, after notice of revocation, to a bank which had financed the purchase
price. The seller claimed that these payments, coupled with some continued
use, operated to bar the claim of revocation. The court disagreed and said:
Unless the [buyers] had ... continued to make the loan payments on
[the motorhome], it would have been repossessed by the bank under the
loan agreement. Such action would not be consistent with the buyer's
duty to hold the goods with reasonable care at the seller's disposition,
as required by [section 2-602(2)(b)]. 200
This result is also consistent with the proposed analysis which focuses on
whether the post-revocation acts are inconsistent with the claim of revocation
of acceptance. Because the obligation of the buyer to pay an independent
third-party lender is not affected by the nonconformity of the goods, 20'
continued payment to the third-party lender is in no way inconsistent with
the claim that the goods are nonconforming or the claim that the noncon-
formity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer. This result
should be reached even though the continued payments would be an "act
of ownership by the buyer" and hence "wrongful" against the seller under
section 2-602(2)(b). 20 2
VI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUYERS WHO
HAVE A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE GOODS
When a buyer rightfully rejects goods or justifiably revokes his acceptance
of goods, he is entitled to recover from the seller "so much of the price as
has been paid." 203 Furthermore,
[o]n rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer
has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any
payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in
their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold
such goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section
2-706).-
The remainder of this article will explore a number of issues relating to the
buyer's security interest in goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance,
including: (1) the types of payments which create a security interest; (2) the
199. 310 N.W.2d 71, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 456 (Minn. 1981).
200. Id. at 77, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 465.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 320-46.
202. Under the proposed analysis, such a wrong only gives the seller a claim for damages,
and it seems highly unlikely that the seller would be able to prove any damages arising from
the buyer's continued payments to an independent third-party lender.
203. U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
204. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
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effect of loss of possession of the goods on the security interest; (3) the
buyer's obligation to use reasonable care in the custody of the goods; (4)
how the buyer may liquidate the security interest; and (5) the relative priority
of the buyer's security interest and competing security interests in the same
goods.
A. What Payments Create a Security Interest?
When a buyer makes a total or partial payment of the purchase price in
cash and thereafter rejects or revokes his acceptance, the buyer has a security
interest in the goods to the extent of such total or partial payment. 205 The
term "payments made on [the goods'] price" 206 also "includes acceptance
of a draft or othet time negotiable instrument or the signing of a negotiable
note."' 2 7 Hence, a buyer who gives a personal check in full or partial payment
of the price208 or who executes a negotiable promissory note209 has "paid"
the seller and has a security interest in the goods to secure the refund of
such payment. Furthermore, a buyer who "trades in" an old car for a credit
on the price of a new car has a security interest in the new car to secure
repayment of the fair market value of the trade-in. 210
One other question relating to what outlays give a buyer a security interest
in the goods is somewhat more difficult: does a buyer who has not made
any payment on the purchase price, but who has incurred expenses of the
type referred to in section 2-711(3), have a security interest in the goods to
the extent of these expenses? One court has held that a buyer who had not
paid any part of the purchase price nevertheless acquired a security interest
in goods by virtue of incurring expenses in the care and custody of the
goods. In Askco Engineering Corp. v. Mobil Chemical Corp.,21" a buyer of
205. E.g., Havas v. Love, 89 Nev. 458, 514 P.2d 1187, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 466 (1973).
206. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
207. U.C.C. § 2-711 comment 2.
208. Of course, if the check is subsequently dishonored, the buyer's tender of payment is
defeated, U.C.C. § 2-511(3), and no security interest in the buyer would arise.
209. It is unclear from the official comment to § 2-711 whether the drafters meant to exclude
signing a nonnegotiable note from the type of payment giving rise to a buyer's security interest.
It could be argued that the giving of a nonnegotiable note does not affect the rights of the
buyer and seller inter se, and thus there is no good reason to exclude the signing of a
nonnegotiable note from the types of payments giving rise to a security interest. On the other
hand, holders in due course of a negotiable instrument take free of all except the "real defenses."
Thus, if the negotiable instrument is negotiated to a holder in due course, the buyer's obligation
to pay the instrument according to its tenor is not subject to the defense that the seller breached
the underlying contract for sale by delivering nonconforming goods. However, since a subsequent
taker of a nonnegotiable note cannot be a holder in due course and cannot take free of the
personal defenses of the maker-buyer, the buyer could defeat the claim to payment by a holder
of a nonnegotiable instrument.
210. Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 134 (1982).
In Ramirez, the seller had resold the trade-in to a third-party purchaser, so the buyers were
awarded the fair market value of the trade-in. The court strongly implied that if the seller had
retained the trade-in, the buyers would be entitled to return of the trade-in itself.
211. 535 S.W.2d 893, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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nonconforming polyethylene reshipped it to the seller who refused to accept
the reshipment. When the polyethylene was returned to the buyer, the buyer
stored it and ran tests to determine its composition. When the seller sued
for the unpaid purchase price, the buyer counterclaimed for its costs of
reshipping, storing, and testing. The court stated that the buyer had acquired
a security interest in the goods by virtue of the expenses it incurred for
storing, testing, and attempting to resell the polyethylene. 212 This result seems
consistent with the language of section 2-711(3). This section is more ex-
pansive than its predecessor, section 69(5) of the Uniform Sales Act, which
gave a rescinding buyer "a lien to secure the repayment of any portion of
the price which has been paid, ' 2 1 but said nothing about a lien covering
the buyer's expenses as well.
The types of expenses which are secured by the security interest granted
to the buyer under section 2-711(3) are those "reasonably incurred in their
inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody." 21 4 The official com-
ment to section 2-711(3) states that the "buyer's security interest . . . is
intended to be limited to the items listed in subsection (3)."'25 The question
arises whether expenses incurred in repairing the goods are also covered by
the buyer's security interest. In Lanners v. Whitney,2 6 the buyer purchased
a used airplane which turned out to be nonconforming. The buyer revoked
his acceptance of the plane and sued for rescission and damages. The court
awarded the buyer incidental damages, including amounts spent to repair
the plane, and noted that the buyer had a security interest in the airplane
to cover these amounts. 2 7 Generally, it would seem that expenses to repair
the goods ought to be secured by the buyer's security interest as expenses
"reasonably incurred" in the "care and custody" of the rejected goods.
When and to what extent expenses are "reasonably incurred" are questions
of fact, and the reported decisions have not addressed these questions in
any detail. However, some guidance may be derived from cases dealing with
the award of incidental damages in the nature of expenses incurred in the
care and custody of goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance. 2' In
O'Brien v. Wade,219 a buyer purchased a Labrador retriever for $300 based
on express warranties that the dog had been extensively trained for hunting
and on a promise that registration papers for the dog would be furnished.
212. Id. at 896, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1123.
213. UNIF. SALES ACT § 69(5) (1906) (act superseded by Uniform Commercial Code 1952).
214. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
215. U.C.C. § 2-711 comment 2.
216. 247 Or. 223, 428 P.2d 398, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 369 (1967).
217. Id. at 236-37, 428 P.2d at 404, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 379.
218. Incidental damages recoverable by a buyer of nonconforming goods pursuant to § 2-
715(l) of the Code are limited to "expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, trans-
portation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected." U.C.C. § 2-715(1). This language
is virtually identical to the language describing the expenses secured by the buyer's security
interest in § 2-711(3). See U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
219. 540 S.W.2d 603, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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The seller thereafter refused to supply the buyer with the promised papers,
and the dog proved to be unsuitable for hunting. When the seller refused
to cancel the contract, the buyer placed the dog in a kennel and sued for
damages for breach of contract, seeking to recover the expenses of keeping
the dog in the kennel, which by the time of trial exceeded $3,000. After a
judgment for the buyer, the seller appealed and claimed that the award of
incidental damages was excessive."0 The appellate court agreed and reduced
the award of incidental damages to an amount equal to the cost of boarding
the dog in the kennel for sixty days, or a total of $90.221 The court relied
on pre-Code cases holding that a buyer cannot retain goods which are
"worthless" and thereby multiply the damages due from the seller.222 How-
ever, the court noted, somewhat inconsistently, that the dog was worth about
$50 notwithstanding its unsuitability for hunting and the absence of proper
registration papers23
In contrast is Keck v. Wacker,22 where the buyers purchased a thor-
oughbred mare at auction for $117,000 based on a description of the mare's
breeding history contained in the auction catalogue. The description was
erroneous and the buyers revoked their acceptance. The evidence at trial was
that the mare was actually worth about $40,000. The court found for the
buyers and concluded that the buyers were entitled to incidental damages
for the insurance, care, custody, and preservation of the mare from the date
of sale to the date of judgment, a period of two-and-one-half years. 225
These cases indicate the divergence of opinion in the courts about what
expenses may be "reasonably incurred" in the care and custody of noncon-
forming goods. They do suggest, however, that unless the goods are essen-
tially worthless, or unless the costs of care and custody greatly exceed the
market value of the goods, the buyer should be entitled to recover expenses
incurred in the care and custody of the goods from the date of rejection or
revocation to the date of judgment. As a general proposition, the court
should defer to the buyer's judgment in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances. First, courts should recognize that the buyer is subject to
being "whipsawed" by the seller. If the buyer decides to resell or destroy
the goods rather than incur additional costs for their care and custody, the
seller will argue that such acts are inconsistent with the seller's ownership
and thus a reacceptance of the goods under section 2-606(1)(c). 226 Further-
more, it is the seller who placed the buyer in the position of deciding what
to do with the nonconforming goods by failing to retake possession of those
220. Id. at 604, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 387.
221. Id. at 606, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 389-90.
222. Id. at 605, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 389.
223. Id. at 606, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 389-90.
224. 413 F. Supp. 1377, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 94 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
225. Accord Broglie v. MacKay-Smith, 541 F.2d 453, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 114 (4th Cir.
1976); Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 223, 428 P.2d 398, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 369 (1967).
226. See supra notes 172-94 and accompanying text.
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goods, and any doubt about the reasonableness of expenses incurred in their
care and custody should be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party, the
buyer.
Finally, it should be noted that the buyer's security interest does not
extend to the buyer's claim for "loss of the bargain" damages. The official
comment to section 2-711 provides: "the buyer is not permitted to retain
such funds [pursuant to his security interest] as he might believe adequate
for his damages. ' 227 Of course, the buyer retains a cause of action to recover
such damages, 228 but the claim to those damages is an unsecured one and
the buyer cannot withhold possession of the goods from the seller based on
the seller's failure to remit the amount of such damages to the buyer.
B. The Requirement of Continued Possession
Under the Uniform Sales Act, courts held that a rescinding buyer's lien
on the goods was only effective as long as the buyer retained possession of
the goods. 229 The same result was reached in Procter & Gamble Distributing
Co. v. Lawrence American Field Warehousing Corp.,230 where the court held
that a buyer of oil stored in a warehouse subject to nonnegotiable bills of
lading naming the seller as cosignor did not have a lien on the oil because
it was not in his possession or control. The court relied on the language of
section 69(5) of the Uniform Sales Act and seemed to equate that provision
with section 2-711(3) of the Code. 2 ' This result seems correct for a number
of reasons.
First, the language of section 2-711(3) itself refers to "a security interest
in goods in his [the buyer's] possession or control. ' 23 2 Second, the official
comments to section 2-711 make explicit cross-reference to section 69(5) of
the Uniform Sales Act and say: "The prior uniform statutory provision is
generally continued and expanded in Subsection (3). 2233 Third, section 9-
113, which relates to security interests arising under article 2, provides that,
so long as the goods are not in the possession of the debtor (seller), there
227. U.C.C. § 2-711 comment 2. Of course, to the extent that expenses incurred in the care
and custody of the goods might also constitute incidental damages pursuant to § 2-715, such
damages are subject to the buyer's security interest.
228. U.C.C. § 2-711 comment 2.
229. E.g., Weaver v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. App. 2d 729, 209 P.2d 830 (1949); Railroad
Waterproofing Corp. v. Memphis Supply, 303 N.Y. 849, 104 N.E.2d 486 (1952); In re Tuduri's
Estate, 156 Misc. 317, 281 N.Y.S. 630 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
230. 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157 (1965).
231. The court stated: "[N]o lien could have attached under subdivision 5 of former section
150 of the Personal Property Law, Consol Laws, c 41 [identical to section 69(5) of the Uniform
Sales Act] (in effect in New Jersey as part of the Uniform Commercial Code at the time of
these transactions) unless the buyer, although free from fault, has the goods in his possession
or control." Id. at 353, 213 N.E.2d at 877, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 792, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 162.
232. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
233. U.C.C. § 2-711 comment on section changes.
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is no requirement for a security agreement to make an article 2 security
interest enforceable. 214 Also, the official comments to this section go on to
say that there is no need for a filing to perfect a security interest "where
the goods are in the possession of the secured party [the buyer] or of a
bailee other than the debtor [seller].""'2 Because a security interest in goods
can only be perfected either by filing or by possession,23 6 and because section
9-113 dispenses with the requirement of filing to perfect an article 2 security
interest, one must look to the article 9 provision governing perfection by
possession, section 9-305. That section provides that a security interest in
goods may be perfected by possession, but such security interest "is perfected
by possession from the time possession is taken without a relation back and
continues only so long as possession is retained. ' 237 Thus, if the buyer gives
up possession of the goods, his security interest becomes unperfected. Fur-
thermore, if he gives up possession of the goods to the seller, his security
interest is not only unperfected,"38 but there is no enforceable security interest
at all in the absence of a security agreement signed by the seller.239 Finally,
the result in Procter & Gamble makes sense because, so long as the buyer
is in possession-of the goods, it is unlikely that any of the seller's creditors
would be misled into extending credit to the seller on the security of such
goods,m but the same cannot be said if the goods are in the seller's pos-
session.
C. The Duty to Hold the Goods With Reasonable Care
and the Option to Use the Goods
Unlike the rejecting or revoking buyer who does not have a security interest
in the goods and whose only duty is to hold the goods with reasonable care
for a time sufficient for the seller to retake possession of them,24' a buyer
who has a security interest in the goods "must use reasonable care in the
custody and preservation of collateral in his possession.' ' 242 What actions
constitute "reasonable care" is a question of fact,'43 but reported cases give
some guidance about the resolution of this question.
In McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co.,'" the buyer of a car revoked
her acceptance and sought to recover the purchase price after she experienced
234. U.C.C. § 9-113(a), (b).
235. U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 2.
236. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(a), 9-305.
237. U.C.C. § 9-305.
238. It is highly unlikely that the seller would agree to execute a financing statement for
filing, which is the only other way for a secured party to perfect a security interest in goods.
239. U.C.C. § 9-113(a). It is equally unlikely that the seller would agree to execute a security
agreement.
240. Cf. Warr & SummERs, supra note 3, § 23-10, at 933-34.
241. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b). See supra text accompanying notes 65-93.
242. U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
243. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marino Corp., 74 A.D.2d 620, 425 N.Y.S.2d 34,
28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 556, 558 (1980).
244. 57 Or. App. 443, 645 P.2d 543, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1315 (1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 295 Or. 494, 668 P.2d 365, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 130 (1983).
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serious mechanical difficulties with the car. The seller refused to refund the
purchase price or retake possession of the car, and the buyer stored the car
in a garage for two years while pursuing litigation. The buyer drove the car
about 3,000 miles in trips to the seller for repairs, to her attorney's office
for the purpose of inspecting the car, and on other trips because she believed
it was mechanically unwise to leave the car idle. The court indicated that
such use was appropriate for the purpose of preserving the value of the car,
citing section 9-207.241
Although some limited use for the purpose of preserving the collateral
has been approved, courts have been less receptive to buyers' arguments
that extensive use of the subject goods is authorized by section 9-207. A
recent example is Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 246 where the court held
that the buyers' driving of an automobile for 2,600 miles after giving notice
of revocation of acceptance went far beyond the use required to safeguard
the goods. 247
A failure by a buyer to use "reasonable care" to preserve the collateral
gives the seller a right to damages resulting from such failure, but does not
invalidate the buyer's security interest. 248
As noted earlier, 249 buyers of goods who do not have a security interest
and who continue to use the goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance
are often found to have forfeited the right to reject or revoke acceptance
as a result of such continued use. Buyers who have a security interest in
such goods, however, have fared much better by virtue of section 9-207(4),
which provides in relevant part: "A secured party [buyer] may use or operate
the collateral for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its value .... ,250
The principle underlying this section has been invoked in a series of cases
involving buyers of mobile homes who continued to live in the homes after
rejection or revocation of acceptance. 25 ' Courts have tended to uphold such
continued used by the buyers on the ground that abandoning possession of
the mobile home would invite damage from the elements or from vandals
and that the only other alternative-covered storage-would be unduly ex-
pensive. 252
245. 57 Or. App. at 448, 645 P.2d at 546, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1318.
246. 277 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 120 (1984).
247. Id. at 162, 313 S.E.2d at 390, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 128.
248. U.C.C. § 9-207(3).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 126-71.
250. U.C.C. § 9-207(4).
251. E.g., Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1102
(1976); Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 874
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Keen v. Modem Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 527, 578 P.2d 668,
24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 881 (1978); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382, 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1206 (1976).
252. E.g., Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 292, 545 P.2d 1382, 1386, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1206, 1212 (1976).
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D. Liquidating the Buyer's Security Interest:
Resale Under Section 2-706
A buyer who has a security interest in goods after rightful rejection or
justifiable revocation of acceptance may "resell them in like manner as an
aggrieved seller (Section 2-706). ' ' 213 It should be noted at the outset that the
standards governing the liquidation of the buyer's security interest in the
rejected goods are contained in section 2-706, not in the standards governing




Section 2-706 contains relatively detailed procedural requirements which
the rejecting buyer must follow in reselling the nonconforming goods. The
buyer is given the options of selling at a public or private sale and as a unit
or in parcels,255 but "every aspect of the sale including the method, manner,
time, place, and terms must be commercially reasonable. ' ' 2_5 The principal
procedural requirement is that the buyer must give notice to the seller of
the intention to resell at a private sale 57 and reasonable notice of the time
and place of the sale if the resale is a public one.258 If the proceeds from
the resale exceed the amounts subject to the buyer's security interest, the
buyer must account to the seller for such excess. 259
There is a substantial body of case law elaborating on the requirements
of section 2-706 in cases where the buyer has breached and the seller resells
the goods which were the subject of the breached contract. Many of the
principles developed in these decisions, especially those dealing with questions
of the proper form and content of the notice of resale and the commercial
reasonableness of the terms of the sale, should be equally applicable to
situations where a rejecting buyer is selling goods to satisfy his statutory
security interest. This article will not attempt a comprehensive review of
these cases, but will examine a set of discrete problem areas where the
principles developed in cases involving a seller's exercise of his section 2-
706 resale remedy should not apply to situations where a rejecting buyer is
reselling nonconforming goods. These problem areas are: (1) who is entitled
to notice?; (2) what is the effect of a resale price that is disproportionately
small in comparison to the contract price?; and (3) what is the effect of a
253. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
254. In addition to the explicit cross-reference to § 2-706 contained in § 2-711(3), § 9-113(c)
provides that article 2 security interests are generally subject to the provisions of article 9,
except that "the rights of the secured party [buyer] on default by the debtor [seller] are governed
by the Article on Sales (Article 2)." U.C.C. § 9-113(c).
255. U.C.C. § 2-706(2).
256. Id.
257. U.C.C. § 2-706(3).
258. U.C.C. § 2-706(4)(b). This subsection excuses giving notice of the time and place of a
public sale if the goods are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily. No such exception
is provided for where the resale is at a private sale.
259. U.C.C. § 2-706(6).
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buyer's failure to follow the procedures for resale mandated by section 2-
706?
1. Who is Entitled to Notice?
A literal reading of subsections (3) and (4) of section 2-706 indicates that
only the seller of goods is entitled to receive notice of the rejecting buyer's
resale. Limiting notice to the other party to the contract for sale makes
sense when an aggrieved seller is utilizing the resale remedy of section 2-706
following a breach by the buyer. In those circumstances, it is unlikely that
any person other than the buyer would claim an interest in the property
being resold. In the typical situation where the buyer wrongfully rejects the
goods, fails to make a required payment for them prior to delivery, or
repudiates the contract, the goods will not have been in the buyer's possession
and it is unlikely that any secured creditor of the buyer would have any
enforceable interest in the goods. 260
On the other hand, where the buyer has had possession of the goods over
a period of time prior to revocation of acceptance, it is much more likely
that a secured party of the buyer will claim a security interest in the goods.
A competing secured party is entitled to notice of a sale of collateral from
an article 9 secured party261 but such is not the case of a competing secured
party claiming an interest in rejected goods, at least under a literal reading
of section 2-706.
A competing secured party could argue that he should be entitled to notice
of the rejecting buyer's resale based on the language of sections 9-113 and
9-504. Section 9-113 provides that a security interest arsing solely under
article 2 is subject to the provisions of article 9 so long as the seller does
not lawfully obtain possession of the goods-, except that "the rights of the
secured party [buyer] on default by the debtor [seller] are governed by the
Article on Sales (Article 2).' 262 The 1978 official text of section 9-504 provides
260. One of the requirements for a security interest to be enforceable against third parties
is that "the debtor [buyer] has rights in the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c). Although a buyer
of goods acquires a "special property" in goods when they are identified to the contract,
U.C.C. § 2-501(1), one court has held that a buyer's wrongful rejection of goods terminates
this "special property" in goods. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d
114, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1019 (10th Cir. 1974) (buyer wrongfully rejected crude oil and seller
exercised its rights of stoppage in transit and reclamation before buyer filed for bankruptcy;
held that order of bankruptcy court did not reach the oil because it was not "property" of
the debtor).
261. U.C.C. § 9-504(3). This section was amended in 1972 to require notice only to other
secured parties who had made a written request for notice. The 1962 version of this section
provided for notice to all other secured parties who had filed a financing statement indexed
in the name of the debtor or who were known to the secured party to have a claim against
the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962).
262. U.C.C. § 9-113(c). A comment to this section states that "in the case of a buyer who
has a security interest in rejected goods under section 2-711(3), the buyer is the 'secured party'
and the seller is the 'debtor.' " Id. comment 3.
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that a secured party disposing of collateral must give notice of the disposition
to "any other secured party from whom the secured party has received...
written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral." 263 The 1962 official
text of section 9-504 required the secured party to give notice of disposition
of the collateral to "any other person who has a security interest in the col-
lateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of
the debtor in this state or who is known to the secured party to have a security
interest in the collateral. '" 26
Thus, a competing secured party could argue that section 9-113 only refers
to article 2 as governing the "rights" of the buyer on default, but section
9-504 governs the "duties" or "obligations" of the buyer, including the
obligation to give notice to the persons described in section 9-504. However,
an official comment to section 9-113 makes it clear that section 9-113(c)
"makes inapplicable the default provisions of Part 5 of this Article, since
the Sales Article contains detailed provisions governing . . . resale after
breach." 265 This language seems clearly to displace all of the default pro-
visions of part 5 of article 9, regardless of whether these provisions are
characterized as creating "rights" or imposing "duties" on the rejecting
buyer.
Although section 2-706 imposes no requirement that a buyer give notice
of resale to a secured party, in all likelihood a buyer who sells nonconforming
goods without giving notice of the disposition to the secured party will be
in default under the terms of the security agreement between the buyer and
the secured party. A typical security agreement provides that any unau-
thorized sale or other disposition of the collateral will constitute an event
of default.266
2. Resale Price Disproportionately Small
in Comparison to Contract Price
When a seller exercises his resale remedy under section 2-706 after the
buyer has breached, courts examine the discrepancy between the resale price
and the contract price as one indication of whether the seller has resold the
goods in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. For example,
in California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones,267 where the contract price on the
263. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
264. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962).
265. U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 2 (citing §§ 2-706 and 2-711(3)).
266. See SECuRrY INTERESTS: SELECTED PROBLEMS IN PERFECTION, PRIORITY, AND ENFORCE-
MENT app. 640, para. 3.2(e) (sample Loan and Security Agreement) (Practising Law Institute
1979).
267. 415 F.2d 554, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1007 (6th Cir. 1969).
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subject airplane was $100,000 and the buyer had, before default, made
improvements costing about $15,000, resale of the plane for $31,000 was
found to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such sale was
commercially reasonable. 268 Similarly, substantial discrepancy in the resale
price and the prevailing market price of similar goods has been found to
be evidence of bad faith or commercial unreasonableness. 26
9
No such inference should necessarily be drawn from even a sizeable dis-
crepancy between the contract price and the resale price obtained by a
rejecting buyer. Because it is assumed that the goods did not conform to
the contract and that the nonconformity substantially impaired the value of
the goods to the buyer, one would expect for there to be a considerable gap
between the resale price and the contract price. Furthermore, because nothing
in section 2-706 exempts a resale from the ordinary rules governing implied
warranties, the rejecting or revoking buyer will likely attempt to disclaim
all warranties, which further increases the possibility that the resale will yield
a comparatively low price. Thus, normally, a discrepancy between the con-
tract price and the resale price should not be a factor in determining whether
the buyer's resale was conducted in good faith and in a commercially rea-
sonable manner.270 However, where the rejection or revocation of acceptance
was based on a nonconformity not relating to the quality of the goods, such
as a late delivery, a substantial discrepancy between the resale price and the
contract price would be more relevant to a determination of good faith and
commercial reasonableness.
3. Sanctions for Buyer's Noncompliance with Section 2-706
When an aggrieved seller exercises his resale remedy under section 2-706
but fails to follow the procedural requirements governing such resales, the
sanction imposed on the seller for that failure is to prevent him from proving
damages based on the difference between the contract price and the resale
price. Instead, the seller is relegated to proving damages based on the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time and
place of tender. 271
268. Id. at 556, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1010.
269. See Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1037 (9th
Cir. 1979) (collusive sale solely for purposes of fixing seller's damages).
270. The rejecting buyer's situation is closely akin to the situation of an aggrieved seller
reselling wrongfully rejected goods which have been specially manufactured for the buyer's
needs. See Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1179 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1971) (resale of specially manufactured goods netted $800 when contract price was $3,600;
held commercially reasonable).
271. E.g., Foxco Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 694 (5th
Cir. 1979); Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1154 (D.S.D. 1977); Lee
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 117 (1976);
B & R Textile Corp. v. Paul Rothman Indus., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 996 (N.Y. App. Term.
1979).
[Vol. 60:663
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUYERS
The sanction for an improperly conducted resale has no meaning at all
in the situation where a rejecting buyer resells nonconforming goods to
satisfy his article 2 security interest because the buyer will not be utilizing
the resale provisions of section 2-706 to measure his damages for the seller's
breach. Courts examining the problem of what sanctions to impose on a
rejecting buyer who has failed to comply with the requirements of section
2-706 have reached different results.
In Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp.,272 a delay of nearly two years between
the buyer's rejection of nonconforming goods and his sale of them was held
to be commercially unreasonable. The court stated that "[e]xcessive delay
in such a resale is enough to make the sale commercially unreasonable. 2713
The court noted that during the delay, the condition of the goods had further
deteriorated, and that when the buyer had finally resold the goods without
notice to the seller, he received only $9,200.74 This was compared to the
offer of the original seller to "repurchase" them for $22,000.275 Having
found that the buyer failed to comply with the requirements of section 2-
706, the court refused to allow the buyer to recover the balance of the
purchase price he had paid to the seller.276
In Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc.,2 7 the court held that a
delay of two years and two months between the notice of revocation and
the buyer's resale was commercially unreasonable. Because the resale of the
nonconforming crane in question had been unreasonably delayed, the re-
voking buyer had to show that the price received on the resale of the crane
equalled its fair market value at the time of revocation.
2 7 1
In Eska Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co.,279 the buyer rejected about
9,000 coats and later resold them without informing the seller. The court
found that the buyer had a security interest in the coats for storage and
other costs, but that the buyer had failed to give the seller the required
notice of intention to resell. 280 In addition, the court found that the buyer
had failed to account to the seller for the excess amounts received from the
resale. 28' Despite these failures to comply with section 2-706, which the court
stated "went beyond the range of permissible conduct for a buyer in pos-
session of rejected goods, ' 282 the court held that the buyer merely had to
return to the seller the amount for which the jackets were resold, less the
272. 99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 130 (1982).
273. Id. at 259, 657 P.2d at 115, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 139 (citing McMillan v. Meuser
Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 110 (1976)).
274. Deaton, Inc., 99 N.M. at 259, 657 P.2d at 115, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 139.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 57 (1971).
278. Id. at 113, 192 N.W.2d at 592, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 74.
279. 483 F. Supp. 1228, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
280. Id. at 1234, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 542.
281. Id. at 1235, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 543.
282. Id. at 1234, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 542.
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buyer's expenses and a reasonable commission. 283 However, the court did
say that the duty to account to the seller included a duty to keep accurate
records of the sales, and the buyer's failure to do so meant that all uncer-
tainties with regard to the price for which the jackets were resold would be
resolved against the buyer. 28 4
These three cases closely parallel the three different sanctions courts have
imposed on article 9 secured parties who fail to comply with the requirements
of section 9-504 on disposition of collateral following default by the debtor.
Some courts hold that such noncompliance bars the secured party from
seeking a deficiency judgment. 2 5 Other courts allow a secured party to pursue
a deficiency judgment but require the secured party to overcome a rebuttable
presumption that the value of the collateral equals the amount of the debt. 28 6
Still other courts allow a debtor to set-off against any deficiency judgment
the amount of actual damages the debtor can prove he suffered as a result
of the secured party's noncompliance. 287
In order to evaluate which of these approaches should be applied where
a rejecting buyer fails to resell nonconforming goods in compliance with
section 2-706, it is important to keep in mind the sorts of situations where
the claim of noncompliance might arise. In the typical situation, where the
resale has not yielded sufficient funds to cover the costs secured by the
buyer's security interest, the buyer may sue to recover the remaining amounts
due from the seller. In addition, the buyer may seek to recover his benefit-
of-the-bargain damages or consequential damages, neither of which would be
claims subject to the buyer's security interest in the rejected goods.
In these circumstances, several factors indicate that the court should not
apply a sanction flatly denying the buyer any right to pursue the seller for
these damages based solely on the buyer's noncompliance with section 2-
706. First, many courts which apply this sanction when an article 9 secured
party fails to follow the statutory requirements for disposition of collateral
do not give any plausible explanation why such a sanction is appropriate. 288
283. Id. at 1238, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 548.
284. Id. at 1235, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 544.
285. E.g., Florida First Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 449 So. 2d 861, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1073
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); DiDomenico v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 Md. App. 62, 468 A.2d 1046,
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1427 (1984); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Greiner, 62 Ohio App. 2d 125, 405
N.E.2d 317, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 718 (1978).
286. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rodenberg, 571 F. Supp. 455, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
665 (D. Md. 1983) (federal common law); Ist Charter Lease Co. v. McAl, Inc., 679 P.2d 114,
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1820 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Barney v. Morris, 168 Ga. App. 426, 309
S.E.2d 420, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1434 (1983); Peoples-Merchants Trust Co. v. Dosis, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1084 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Savoy v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Corp.,
503 Pa. 74, 468 A.2d 465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1422 (1983).
287. E.g., In re Deephouse Equip. Co., 38 Bankr. 400, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1810 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1984) (applying Massachusetts law); Valley Mining Co. v. Metro Bank, 383 So. 2d
158, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1231 (Ala. 1980); Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Goubeaux, 136 Ariz. 33,
664 P.2d 183, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1803 (1983).
288. E.g., Miles v. N.J. Motors, Inc., 44 Ohio App. 2d 351, 338 N.E.2d 784, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 555 (1975); One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 792 (1968).
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Second, some courts have justified this result in an article 9 setting by finding
an "accord and satisfaction" where the secured party has allegedly agreed
to keep the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.289 That reasoning, which
is seriously suspect even in the case of an article 9 secured party, is even
harder to swallow in a situation where the rejecting buyer has notified the
seller of the fact that the goods are nonconforming and that he wishes to
return them to the seller in exchange for a refund of the purchase price.
Third, the "no deficiency" rule may have some policy justification if it
deters an article 9 secured party from future noncompliance with the re-
quirements designed to protect debtors from creditor overreaching. Although
that justification is not entirely implausible in the situation of a commercial
lending institution which will likely be involved in sales of collateral on a
frequent basis, it does not apply to a buyer of goods who will rarely, if
ever, be faced again with a situation where a resale of nonconforming goods
will be required.
The other two sanctions for noncompliance differ principally in how the
burden of proof is allocated on the question of the debtor's damages flowing
from the secured party's noncompliance with the requirements for reselling
the collateral. Those courts which invoke a rebuttable presumption that the
fair market value of the collateral is equal to the amount of the debt require
the secured party to prove the extent of the injury to the debtor flowing
from the secured party's noncompliance by a showing of the fair market
value of the goods-that is, what the goods would have brought in a
procedurally proper resale. 290 This approach reflects the common wisdom
that a secured party engaged in the business of lending is likely to be in a
position to have employees or other agents with experience in the sale of
various types of collateral and thus be able to establish the fair market value
of the goods. However, it may be less appropriate to put that burden on a
buyer of nonconforming goods, who is not likely to have similar expertise
at his disposal unless he is engaged in the business of selling goods of that
kind. On the contrary, one would normally assume that the seller of such
goods would be in a better position to prove their fair market value. Thus,
the better approach would be to award the breaching seller damages in the
nature of a set-off to the buyer's damages but place the burden of proving
fair market value on the seller.
E. Competing Security Interests in the Goods
Although no reported cases deal with the relationship of the buyer's section
2-711(3) security interest in rejected goods to a security interest in the same
289. E.g., Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 117 Ga. App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290, 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1183 (1968); Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 508 (1967).
290. See supra note 286.
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goods held by another, common sense would indicate that, in our credit-
oriented society, persons other than the buyer may often claim a security
interest in rejected goods. This section will analyze the relationship of the
buyer's security interest in the goods to four potential classes of competing
security interests: (1) a security interest retained by the seller to secure any
unpaid purchase price; (2) a security interest given by a consumer buyer to
a seller and subsequently assigned by the seller to a third party; (3) a security
interest given by a nonconsumer buyer to a seller and subsequently assigned
by the seller to a third party; and (4) a security interest given by the buyer
to an independent third-party lender who has no connection with the seller.
1. Seller's Security Interest
The easiest case of conflicting security interests to resolve is where the
seller extends credit to the buyer and retains a security interest in the goods
to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price. A "security interest" is
defined in the Code as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation.' '291 A rightful rejection
or justifiable revocation of acceptance terminates the buyer's obligation to
pay. 292 Once the underlying obligation is extinguished, so is the security
interest.293
Even though the seller's security interest is extinguished, if the seller filed
a financing statement covering the goods, the buyer may have difficulty
reselling the goods under section 2-706 because potential purchasers may be
unwilling to buy goods which are the subject of a filed financing statement. 29
The solution to this problem lies in section 9-404 of the Code. This section
provides that, where there is no outstanding secured obligation, the secured
party must, on written demand by the debtor, send a properly executed
termination statement. 295 Failure of the secured party to furnish such a
termination statement within ten days after proper demand renders the
secured party liable in the amount of $100 and, in addition, for any loss
caused to the debtor by such failure. 29 Hence, a buyer with a security interest
in rejected goods would be well advised to make written demand on the
291. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
292. M. RIGO & R. ALPERT, SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 182 (1982).
293. Id.; Bank of Lexington v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 570 F.2d 1220, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1008 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Kentucky law).
294. If the goods are consumer goods, no filing is required to perfect the seller's purchase
money security interest, other than a security interest in motor vehicles which are required to
be registered. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). Thus, a purchaser of consumer goods at a buyer's resale
takes free of the seller's security interest if he is without knowledge of the security interest,
gives value, and buys for his own personal, family, or household purposes. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
See generally M. RIGG & R. ALPERT, supra note 292, at 182-83.
295. U.C.C. § 9-404(l). In the case of consumer goods, the secured party must file such
termination statement within one month after there is no outstanding secured obligation or
within 10 days after written demand from the debtor. Id.
296. Id.
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seller to furnish a termination statement promptly after rejection or revo-
cation of acceptance in order to facilitate a prompt resale.
2. Assignee's Security Interest-Consumer Buyer
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") promulgated the Trade
Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumer's Claims and De-
fenses. 7 The purpose of this rule is to prohibit an assignee of a consumer
credit contract 298 from, acquiring the status of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument and thus cutting off the consumer's ability to assert
most claims and defenses against the assignee. 29 9 This purpose is achieved
by making it an unfair or deceptive practice for a seller to take or receive
a consumer credit contract which fails to contain a mandatory notice stating
that any holder of the consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller.31 ° The rule also
prohibits a seller from receiving the proceeds of a purchase money loan
unless the consumer credit contract made in connection with the loan contains
an essentially identical notice.30 1 As a result of requiring such notice, the
paper bearing the notice would not under state law be negotiable,30 2 and
thus any assignee of the consumer credit contract could not be a holder in
due course. The rule has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, 303 and a
detailed analysis of its provisions will not be undertaken here. Suffice it to
say that an assignee of a consumer credit contract which complies with the
notice requirements of the rule is subject to all the claims and defenses
which the consumer buyer could assert against the seller. Because the con-
sumer buyer can assert the extinction of the obligation to pay the contract
price as a result of the rejection or revocation of acceptance and the sub-
297. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1985).
298. This term is defined as: "Any instrument which evidences or embodies a debt arising
from a 'Purchase Money Loan' transaction or a 'financed sale' ....." Id. § 433.1(i). The term
"Purchase Money Loan" is defined as:
A cash advance which is received by a consumer in return for a "Finance Charge"
within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, which is
applied, in whole or substantial part, to a purchase of goods or services from a
seller who (1) refers consumers to the creditor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor
by common control, contract, or business arrangement.
Id. § 433.1(d). The term "financing a sale" is defined as: "Extending credit to a consumer in
connection with a 'Credit Sale' within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation
Z." Id. § 433.1(e).
299. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302 to -305.
300. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1985).
301. Id. § 433.2(b).
302. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 14-8, at 572.
303. See, e.g., Garner & Dunham, FTC Rule 433 and the Uniform Commercial Code: An
Analysis of Current Lender Status, 43 Mo. L. REv. 199 (1978); Note, The FTC's Preservation
of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consumer Security or Consumer Fraud?, 11 VAL. U.L.
REv. 263 (1976); Comment, The FTC Holder in Due Course Rule: Neither Creditor Ruination
Nor Consumer Salvation, 31 Sw. L.J. 1097 (1977).
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sequent invalidity of any security interest securing payment of the contract
price, the assignee of the seller will be unable to enforce the debt or any
security interest securing repayment of the debt.31 4 In addition to the FTC
rule, there are also numerous state statutes limiting the scope of the "holder
in due course" rule in the consumer setting.305
3. Assignee's Security Interest-Nonconsumer Buyer
In situations not involving consumer buyers, and thus outside the scope
of the FTC rule and the state consumer-protection statutes just mentioned,
the rights of a rejecting buyer in relation to an assignee of the seller depend
on whether the assignee qualifies as a holder in due course or on whether
the buyer has signed an agreement not to assert against an assignee any
defense which he might have against the seller.
In order to qualify as a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument,
an assignee of the seller must meet the well-known requirements of section
3-302(1) of the Code, which are as follows:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes an instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."'
The requirement of taking for value is defined in section 3-303,107 and the
requirement of lack of notice is defined in section 3-304.30s If an assignee
304. In addition to assignments by the seller, the rule also applies to creditors who extend
loans directly to consumers if the creditors are "affiliated" with the seller or if the seller refers
customers to the creditor. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1(d), 433.2(b) (1985).
305. The statutes are reviewed in Willier, Need for Preservation of Buyer's Defenses-State
Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 132 (1972). For a discussion of the interplay between the
FTC rule and the state statutes, see Comment, supra note 269, at 1103-06.
306. U.C.C. § 3-302(1).
307. The section provides:
A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that
he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise
than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an ante-
cedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable
commitment to a third person.
U.C.C. § 3-303.
308. The section provides:
(1) the purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument-is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or
alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity,
terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable in
whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has
knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as
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of the seller achieves the status of a holder in due course, he takes free of
all but the limited "real defenses" specified in section 3-305(2). 309 Thus, if
the seller's assignee is a holder in due course, he would not be subject to
the buyer's claim that the goods are nonconforming, and the buyer's un-
dertaking to pay the contract price can be enforced by the assignee 10
Furthermore, subject to any statute or decision establishing a different
rule for buyers of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer not to assert
against the assignee any claim or defense which he might have against the
security for his own debt or in any transaction for his benefit or otherwise in
breach of duty.
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reason
to know
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is an
uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been made or
more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A reasonable time
for a check drawn and payable within the states and territories of the
United States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty days.
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser
notice of a defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise or
accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice
that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser
has notice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
Cf) that there has been default in payment of interest on the instrument or
in payment of any other instrument, except one in the same series.
(5) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute notice
within the provisions of this Article to a person who would otherwise be a holder
in due course.
(6) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such manner
as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
U.C.C. § 3-304.
309. This section provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument
free from ...
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders
the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge
of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-305(2).
310. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman, 129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686,
13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 553 (1973).
19851
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
seller is enforceable by an assignee who takes the assignment for value, in
good faith and without notice of a claim or defense as to all but those
defenses which could be asserted against a holder in due course.3 1 Even
absent such an explicit agreement, where the buyer as a part of one trans-
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement, he is
deemed to have agreed to such a waiver of defenses. 3 2 Thus, an assignee
of a sales contract containing, or deemed to contain, a waiver of defenses
clause is not subject to the buyer's claim that the goods are nonconforming
and can enforce the buyer's obligation to pay the contract price.3 13
Therefore, an assignee who is either a holder in due course or a beneficiary
of a waiver of defenses clause has a valid obligation owing from the buyer
and, assuming that the prerequisites for the creation of a security interest
have been met, an enforceable security interest in the goods. The question
then becomes a matter of the relative priority of the assignee's and the
buyer's security interests. Assuming that the assignee's security interest has
been duly perfected by the timely filing of a financing statement, the assignee
will be able to claim priority in the collateral. Because the assignee's security
interest was "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all
or part of its price," the assignee's security interest constitutes a "purchase
money security interest. ' 314 Pursuant to section 9-312(4) of the Code, a
purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has prior-
ity over a conflicting security interest in the collateral if the purchase money
security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the collateral or within ten days thereafter.3 15 Thus, assuming that the security
interest of the assignee was timely perfected, the assignee would have priority
over the buyer and any sale of the collateral by the rejecting buyer would
not extinguish the assignee's security interest in the goods. The assignee
would also be entitled to pursue the receipts of the sale under the Code's
provision on proceeds.3t 6
If the collateral is "inventory, ' 31 7 the assignee would also have priority
over the buyer's security interest because the buyer would not have filed a
financing statement covering the inventory which would give him the right
of notification otherwise required for a purchase money security interest in
inventory to achieve priority.3"8
311. U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. David 0. Crump Sand & Fill Co., 470 F. Supp.
489, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
314. U.C.C. § 9-107(a).
315. U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
316. U.C.C. § 9-306.
317. "Inventory" is defined as goods "if they are held by a person who holds them for sale
or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if
they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in business." U.C.C.
§ 9-109(4). Arguably, goods which have been rejected by a buyer would not be "inventory"
because he holds them pursuant to his security interest under § 2-711(3), not for sale or lease.
318. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
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Thus, assuming that the assignee's security interest has been duly and
timely perfected, he will be entitled to claim priority over the buyer's section
2-711(3) security interest. If the assignee's security interest is unperfected,
of course, the buyer has priority so long as his section 2-711(3) security
interest remains perfected by his possession. 1 9
4. Third-Party Lender's Security Interest
When an independent third-party lender has acquired a security interest
in the rejected goods, the buyer's obligations to that third party are totally
independent of any claims or defenses which the buyer might be able to
assert against the seller arising from the nonconformity of the goods. Thus,
the buyer's obligation to pay the third-party lender pursuant to their agree-
ment remains intact and the question again becomes one of the priority of
the conflicting security interests in the goods.
Assuming that the third party advanced money to the buyer for the purpose
of paying all or part of the purchase price of the nonconforming goods,
the third party would have a purchase money security interest in the goods. 320
Thus, the third party's purchase money security interest would have priority
over the buyer's security interest in the same fashion as an assignee's purchase
money security interest, assuming, of course, that the third-party lender's
security interest was duly and timely perfected. 32
If the third-party lender's security interest is not a purchase money security
interest, then the priority of the third-party lender's security interest in
relation to the buyer's section 2-711(3) security interest is governed by sub-
sections (a) and (b) of section 9-312(5), which provide:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of
filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made
covering the collateral or the time the security interest is first
perfected, whichever is earlier, provided that there is no period
thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first
to attach has priority.3 2"
Before proceeding to look at some examples of how this section might apply,
it is important to determine at what point in time a buyer's section 2-711(3)
319. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a). See U.C.C. § 9-305.
320. Section 9-107(b) provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that
it is ...
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral
if such value is in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107(b).
321. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4). See supra text accompanying notes 314-19.
322. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), (b).
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security interest becomes "perfected," because the buyer will not be in a
position to perfect his security interest by filing in view of the fact that he
has no financing statement to file. Because the only other way to perfect a
security interest in goods is possession, one must look to section 9-305 for
the article 9 rules governing perfection by possession. That section provides
that a "security interest is perfected by possession from the time possession
is taken without a relation back and continues only so long as possession
is retained. ' 32 3 Hence, for purposes of determining perfection, the date of
the perfection of the buyer's security interest is the date he first acquired
possession, assuming that his possession thereafter was continuous. 324
It could be argued that the buyer's security interest does not arise until
the buyer rejects the goods or revokes his acceptance in view of the language
of section 2-711(3) that "[oln rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of
acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or
control.' '325 However, an article 2 security interest is subject, with certain
exceptions, to the requirements of article 9,326 including the requirements
regarding perfection, and thus article 9 perfection provisions would override
any contrary inference to be drawn from the language of article 2 regarding
the time of perfection.
Moreover, granting priority to the buyer's security interest based on the
date of first possession is consistent with the way article 9 treats perfection
by filing. A secured party who files a financing statement before he makes
any advances to the debtor takes priority over a second secured party who
files later than the first secured party, even though the second secured party
made advances to the debtor first and his advances were perfected when
made, and even though the first secured party knew of the second secured
party's advances.3
27
With these principles in mind, there are two situations where the question
of priority might arise. First, where the third-party lender has filed a fi-
nancing statement covering after-acquired property of the buyer-debtor prior
to the time the buyer first takes possession of the goods in question, the
third-party lender would prevail over the buyer. On the other hand, where
the buyer takes possession of the goods prior to the time the third-party
lender files its financing statement covering the goods, the buyer would
prevail over the third-party lender.
While these results appear to be compelled by a literal interpretation of
the article 9 priority provisions, they are hardly consistent with the expec-
tations of the parties or the realities of commercial lending. It makes little
323. U.C.C. § 9-305.
324. If the buyer returns the goods to the seller for repair, the date of perfection of the
buyer's security interest would be the date the goods were returned to the buyer after the last
unsuccessful attempt at repair by the seller.
325. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
326. U.C.C. § 9-113.
327. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 5, example I.
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sense to accord priority to a third-party lender who has a perfected security
interest in after-acquired property, yet deny priority to a third-party lender
who made advances to the buyer in reliance on the security afforded by
existing goods owned by the buyer. In the former situation, it is less likely
that the lender was actually relying on the existence of the after-acquired
property in determining whether to make the loan. In the latter situation,
it is much more likely that the lender was actually relying on the buyer's
apparent ownership of the goods when evaluating the assets available for
liquidation in the event of the buyer's default.
The principal problem leading to these questionable results is the way
article 9 treats a secured party's possession of collateral as a method of
perfecting the secured party's security interest. Generally, of course, a third
party's possession of goods which the debtor claims to own is excellent notice
to a prospective lender that someone other than the debtor may claim an
interest in the collateral. 28 However, the same cannot be said when the
owner of property has goods in his possession in which he may at some
later time claim a security interest. In the latter situation, the buyer's pos-
session does not give any notice at all to a prospective lender that the buyer
may be, in effect, a competing secured party with a security interest in the
collateral. Thus, according priority to the security interest of a rejecting
buyer vis-d-vis an independent third-party lender cuts strongly against the
Code's policy of not affording protection to "secret liens."129
The problem of priorities does not end here, however. Assuming that a
rejecting buyer's article 2 security interest would have priority over the
security interest of an independent third-party lender, the question remains
whether the rejecting buyer's resale of the nonconforming goods extinguishes
the subordinate security interest of that lender. A rejecting buyer who claims
priority over the security interest of an independent third-party lender will
likely claim than his resale of the goods operates to extinguish "any security
interest or lien subordinate" to his security interest pursuant to section 9-
504(4). However, as noted earlier,330 section 9-113 and the comments thereto
indicate the drafters' intention to displace all of the default provisions of
part 5 of article 9 in the case of a security interest arising solely under article
2, including, presumably, the provisions relating to the effect of a buyer's
sale of nonconforming goods on competing security interests in the same
collateral.
No resolution of this problem can be squared with both the existing
language of the Code and the policy justifications underlying articles 2 and
9. If a court decides that the buyer's resale extinguishes the subordinate
328. See WHITE & SUmMERS, supra note 3, § 23-10, at 933-34.
329. See, e.g., 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.1, at 439
(1965). This principle has been firmly imbedded in the common law since Twyne's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
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security interest of the independent third-party lender, it would have to say
that some provisions of part 5 of article 9 on default apply to article 2
security interests while others do not, thus ignoring the language of section
9-113 and the comments thereto. Such a holding would also allow a debtor
(the rejecting buyer) to sell goods free of a perfected security interest he
created where the holder of that perfected security interest had absolutely
no notice of any competing security interest in the collateral. On the other
hand, if section 9-504 does not apply to a buyer's resale, there is then no
provision in article 2 which states the effect of a resale on a competing
security interest.
Perhaps the most appropriate solution to this problem is to hold that,
because a rejecting buyer's claim to priority is based on a literal reading of
Code provisions which is inconsistent with the underlying Code policy of
not giving effect to "secret liens," the buyer's resale should not extinguish
the security interest of the third-party lender but instead limit the lender to
pursuing the collateral and the proceeds thereof in the same manner in which
a secured party would proceed when dealing with a situation where his
debtor has wrongfully sold collateral.
If this analysis is pursued, the third-party lender's security interest in the
goods continues after the sale by the buyer unless the sale was authorized
by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise. 3 . Thus, unless
the lender has authorized the buyer to sell the nonconforming goods, 32 the
lender's security interest continues to be a perfected security interest in the
goods in the hands of the purchaser of the goods.
The purchaser of the goods could claim that he is a buyer in ordinary
course of business and that he thus takes free of the lender's security interest
under either section 9-307(1) or section 2-403(1). However, a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" is one "who in good faith and without knowl-
edge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind. ' 3 3 Normally, a purchaser at
331. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
332. The language of § 9-306(2) is not a model of clarity. The relevant language provides:
"[A] security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise ...." Id. It could be argued that the term "or otherwise" modifies the word
"authorized," and, because the buyer's resale is "authorized" by §§ 2-711(3) and 2-706, the
secured party's security interest in the goods does not continue after the buyer has resold them.
However, that interpretation is, at best, a strained reading of that section. In addition, courts
have generally assumed that the term "or otherwise" modifies the words "by the secured party
in the security agreement." E.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.,
626 F.2d 764, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 743 (10th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, if the term "or
otherwise" modifies the term "authorized," it would mean that the secured party could only
authorize disposition of the collateral in the security agreement. Finally, § 9-306(2) begins with
the phrase "Except where this Article [91 otherwise provides ...." U.C.C. § 9-306(2). Thus,
it could be argued that any provisions of article 2 are irrelevant.
333. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
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a buyer's resale will not likely qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of
business for two reasons. First, the rejecting buyer will often not be "a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind." Second, the rejecting
buyer's resale is probably not a sale "in ordinary course." Although that
term is not defined in the Code, one court has held that a purchaser at an
execution sale is not a buyer in ordinary course,33 4 and a purchaser at a
rejecting buyer's resale should likewise be held not to buy in ordinary course.
Thus, the third-party lender should be able to reach goods in the hands of
a purchaser at a buyer's resale.335
In addition to the continuation of the lender's security interest in the
goods following their resale, the lender also has a security interest "in any
identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor [buyer]. '336
However, the lender's security interest in those proceeds is only a perfected
security interest for a period of ten days after the disposition unless one of
three things occurs: (1) a filed financing statement covers the original col-
lateral and the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be
perfected by a filing in the office(s) where the financing statement is filed;33 7
(2) the proceeds are "identifiable cash proceeds; '33 8 or (3) the security interest
in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of the ten-day period. 3 9
It is unlikely that a lender will be able to avail himself of the first of
these three alternative ways to continue the perfected status of his security
interest in proceeds of the resale because the rejecting buyer will typically
receive money or an instrument as proceeds of the resale of the noncon-
forming goods, and a security interest in money or an instrument can only
be perfected by possession.34° Thus, the lender's previously filed financing
statement could not operate to continue perfection of the lender's security
interest in proceeds of this nature. Nor is the lender likely to succeed in
continuing the perfection of his security interest by invoking the third ex-
ception if the proceeds are money or an instrument, because it is improbable
that the rejecting buyer will agree to transfer possession of the proceeds to
the lender.
The second exception is somewhat more likely to result in the lender
having a continued perfected security interest in the proceeds of the buyer's
resale. If the buyer puts the cash proceeds in a separate account, they remain
"identifiable cash proceeds" subject to the lender's continued perfected
security interest. Even if the proceeds are commingled in an account with
334. National Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 223 N.E.2d 515, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
I (1967).
335. The purchaser at the resale may have a claim against the rejecting buyer for breach of
the warranty of title, U.C.C. § 2-312(2), unless the rejecting buyer has effectively disclaimed
that warranty. U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
336. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
337. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a).
338. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b).
339. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(c).
340. U.C.C. § 9-304(l).
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other funds, many courts will apply the so-called "lowest intermediate bal-
ance" test, which provides that proceeds remain in the account so long as
the account balance at all times is equal to or greater than the amount of
the proceeds deposited in the account.3 4' Thus, so long as the account balance
exceeds the amount of the deposit, and so long as insolvency proceedings
are not instituted by or against the buyer,3 42 the lender will have a contin-
uously perfected security interest in the proceeds from the buyer's resale.
Many of these rather abstruse questions relating to the relative priority
of competing security interests in rejected goods are of more academic interest
than practical significance. A rejecting buyer who attempts to sell noncon-
forming goods pursuant to section 2-706 and claim priority in the proceeds
of that sale against a competing third-party lender risks substantial adverse
consequences if he resells the goods without the permission of a lender with
a perfected security interest in those goods. The typical security agreement
provides that any unauthorized sale or disposition of the collateral constitutes
an event of default under the security agreement, 343 which typically allows
the secured party to declare due immediately all amounts owed to the secured
party344 and gives the secured party the right to pursue any other collateral
in which the secured party has a security interest.3 45 Hence, there is substantial
practical incentive for a rejecting buyer to cooperate with an independent
third-party secured lender in disposing of the nonconforming goods.
Finally, the independent third-party lender may avoid the problem of the
buyer claiming priority of his section 2-711(3) security interest by requiring
the buyer to execute a security agreement containing a clause whereby the
buyer agrees to subordinate any security interest in the goods that may be
created in his favor to the security interest granted to the third-party lender.
3 46
CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has illustrated, an attorney advising a rejecting
buyer of nonconforming goods faces a bewildering body of conflicting case
law dealing with questions of what the buyer may or may not do with the
goods after rejection or revocation of acceptance. Although precise consist-
ency of results is more than can be hoped for in view of the fluid standards
of reasonableness and good faith which govern many of these questions,
341. E.g., In re Martin, 25 Bankr. 25, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982);
C.O. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip. Co., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370, 32 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1638 (1982); Coachmen Indus., Inc. v. Security Trust & Say, Bank, 329 N.W.2d
648, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1012 (Iowa 1983).
342. When insolvency proceedings are instituted by or against an article 9 debtor, the secured
party's security interest in commingled accounts is substantially limited. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4).
343. SECURITY INTERESTS: SELECTED PROBLEMS IN PERFECTION, PRIORITY, AND ENFORCEMENT
app. 640, para. 3.2(e) (sample Loan and Security Agreement) (Practising Law Institute 1979).
344. Id. at 642, para. 5.1(a).
345. Id. at 642-43, para. 5.1(b).
346. Subordination is authorized in U.C.C. § 9-316.
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courts have introduced additional and needless confusion by failing to adopt
a consistent method of analyzing what post-rejection or post-revocation acts
by the buyer may invalidate his earlier rejection or revocation. This article
has suggested an approach that would entitle a seller to recover damages
from a buyer who continues to use or otherwise exercise dominion over
goods after he has rejected them or revoked his acceptance of them. Only
where the continued use or other exercise of dominion is inconsistent with
the buyer's claim of rejection or revocation of acceptance should such acts
result in the buyer's forfeiting his claim to rejection or revocation of ac-
ceptance. This approach gives full meaning to the language of the relevant
Code provisions and the official comments thereto, recognizes the legitimate
interests of both the buyer and the seller, and explains the results in most
of the reported cases.
Many of the problems relating to the buyer's security interest in rejected
goods are the result of an apparent lack of coordination between the pro-
visions of article 2, which create security interests and provide for their
liquidation, and the provisions of article 9, which govern questions of their
validity, perfection, and priority.3 47 The solutions offered in this article are
desirable only insofar as they seek to accommodate this lack of coordination
between article 2 and article 9. However, until the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code undertakes a detailed examination
of appropriate amendments to deal with article 2 security interests, it is
likely that uncertainty and conflicting judicial decisions will continue to be
the order of the day.
347. This lack of coordination has been pointed out previously in the context of an unpaid
seller's claims against competing interests in the goods. See Jackson & Peters, Quest for
Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
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